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Policy towards single mothers is a major issue in welfare reform for both New Zealand 
and the USA. These two countries have the highest proportion of single mother families 
in the OECD. In both countries, single mothers have the highest incidence of poverty, 
have lower educational attainment, have a strong ethnic bias and high unemployment 
rates. There is concern for children brought up in single parent families of inter- 
generational welfare dependency and poverty cycles. Although New Zealand has moved 
in the direction of USA single parent policy, with the recent introduction of work-fare 
and in-work benefits, there are significant differences in outcomes between the two 
countries. Economic and social policies and demographic differences are used to explain 
why the US has a high employment rate for single mothers, but a high poverty incidence, 
while New Zealand single mothers have a low attachment to the labour force, and a 
relatively low incidence of poverty. In Part 2, policy options are evaluated against the 
criteria of employment, poverty relief and impact on children, with policy options having 
to operate at national, state or regional and local neighbourhood areas to be successful. 
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POVERTY AND EMPLOYMENT: 
A COMPARISON OF POLICY AND OUTCOMES FOR 
SINGLE MOTHERS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES 
AND NEW ZEALAND 
PART 1: POLICIES AND OUTCOMES 
INTRODUCTION 
Single parent families with dependent children, whether never-married, separated, 
divorced or widowed, have dual roles as breadwinners and child rearers (OECD 1993). 
The conflict between these roles has often resulted in a lower standard of living and 
concern for the well-being of children brought up in single parent families. The conflict 
also highlights the appropriate role for the state versus the family in terms of support for 
the next generation. Countries place different emphases on the level of state involvement 
and preference for self-reliance, with this emphasis changing through time. 
Growth of single parenting was the major demographic feature of the latter half of 
the twentieth century, especially those headed by never-married mothers. On average 
single parent families account for about 15 per cent of all families with children in the 
OECD, and the majority of these families are headed by single mothers. Over the life 
cycle, a far greater proportion of families with dependent children will experience single 
parenthood as a consequence of births outside marriage, divorce, separation and 
widowhood, with cohabitation, (re)marriage or children becoming adults as the source of 
exits from single parenthood. 
There are several reasons why governments are concerned over this growth in 
single parent families: 
1. Single parent families are more likely to suffer economic disadvantage and social 
exclusion, being over-represented among those with low incomes and high poverty 
rates. 
2. There has been a large and increasing fiscal cost associated with supporting single 




There are potential negative effects for children growing up in single parent families, 
with the possibility of cycles of disadvantage, future welfare use, poverty and 
employment levels for those children. 
In some countries, there has been political pressure applied by those who believe that 
welfare support for single parents has encouraged the decline in traditional family 
values and lifestyles. 
To address these concerns, OECD countries have implemented a variety of social 
assistance and employment programs for single parents, with quite different outcomes in 
terms of poverty relief, employment levels, fiscal costs and trends in single parenting, 
especially teenage pregnancy. Each country places different weights on the inter-related 
objectives of containment of fiscal expenditure, poverty relief, self-sufficiency through 
employment, child-rearing and family development. The growth in single parenting has 
led to greater emphasis given to self-sufficiency through employment, in the belief that 
employment provides the long-term solution to poverty and fiscal costs. 
Several international comparative studies have come up with a range of factors 
which influence employment such as age of mother, age of child, level of educational 
attainment and past employment record (OECD 1993, Bradshaw et aZ 1996, Whiteford 
1997, Bradshaw et aZ2000). Because of the large numbers of countries covered in these 
surveys, factors such as the objectives of programs and legislative details such as 
entitlement rules for receipt of welfare have not been focused upon. However, program 
rules and cultural attitudes may have a greater impact on outcomes than the incentive 
structure contained within the benefit system. 
This study concentrates on two countries - New Zealand and United States. These 
countries have almost double the OECD average of single parent families, with a very 
similar demographic structure, including a strong ethnic bias, in their single parenting. 
However, the outcomes are very different - the US has a far higher employment rate of 
single parents, a much lower take-up rate of welfare but a significantly greater poverty 
level than New Zealand. The inference is that policy objectives, parameters, entitlement 
rules and the mechanics of policy implementation have a significant effect on outcomes. 
If this is correct, with New Zealand loosely moving in the direction of US policy, how 
can the employment objective be achieved without leading to a high incidence of poverty 
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among single parent families. It is also useful to know which of the different policy 
options achieve the objectives of encouraging employment, reducing poverty and 
improving outcomes for children. 
Despite the significant population and country size differences (3.8 million in 
New Zealand compared to 280 million in the US), comparison of single parent policy 
between the countries is legitimate: 
Both countries are urban communities with significant minority populations. Maori 
make up 15 percent of New Zealand’s population, slightly large than the African/ 
American population share. Pacific Islanders and HispanicLatino populations have 
equivalent shares of about 7 percent- both are immigrant groups entering since the 
1970s for employment, with smaller groupings of people from Asia.. 
US policy on single mothers has always operated at a mix of state and federal levels. 
Since the change in policy in 1996, federal government involvement has been 
restricted to funding, setting general program directions and accountability 
requirements, with all policy details devolved to state level with often significant 
county and even district office level variation in policy formulation and 
implementation. The median US state, South Carolina, has the same population as 
New Zealand (but less sheep), and many counties and cities in the larger states are of 
comparable size (Fiske and Ladd 2000). 
Both of the countries fall under Esping-Anderson’s (1990) liberal category of welfare 
states, with strong means-testing of welfare benefits, welfare services targeted to 
those in need, strict eligibility requirements and entitlement rules and relatively small 
levels of welfare expenditure’. 
Both countries have a dedicated benefit for single parents - the Domestic Purposes 
Benefit (DPB) in New Zealand*, and Temporary Assistance to Needy Families 
(TANF, which replaced the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) 
program in 1996) in the US. Both countries have undertaken significant reform of 
policy to single parents over the last decade and are cautiously evaluating the 
outcomes. 
Single parents are concentrated in particular locations in both countries, separate from 
the major areas of employment. Baltimore, with the second largest share of single 
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parent families among large US cities, is typical, with single mothers in cheap 
accommodation in inner-city areas, with employment growth in the outer suburbs. In 
New Zealand, single mothers tend to be in the outer suburbs or rural areas, with 
employment growth in the inner city. 
The paper starts by drawing upon the previous comparative research, then draws 
out the salient features for the two countries under study. The paper then looks in detail at 
policy development in both the US and New Zealand in the context of policy objectives, 
before proceeding to analyse the incentive effects in the design of policy. An analysis is 
made of the causes of growth in single parenting in both countries, as well as factors 
influencing employment levels. In Part 2, an evaluation is made of the underlying policy 
options and solutions to poverty and employment, with the evaluation requiring analysis 
at the national, statehegional and local neighbourhood level, as well as short- and long- 
term effects of the policy options. 
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COMPARATIVE RESEARCH ON SINGLE MOTHERS 
International comparisons allow policy makers to investigate how different policy 
frameworks approach the same policy issue, and then analyse how those frameworks 
have influenced outcomes. A major limitation is that differences in cultural perspectives 
and the economic and social context may render the comparisons meaningless. However, 
international comparisons allow new insights into old problems, and are often a cost- 
effective way of measuring the impact of alternative policy parameters. 
For single parent policy, the US has a form of natural experiment. Comparisons 
can be made between the States that have set their own policy parameters under AFDC/ 
TANF, allowing a comparative evaluation of the outcomes. For example, Liebschutz 
(2000) shows the extensive array of different policies that have been implemented since 
the development of TANF in the fives states in her study on policy development, 
including differences at county and local office level. Crouse ( 1999) provides information 
on the major changes that states have made in their implementation of AFDC waivers and 
TANF policy parameters. In investigating the incentive effects of benefit levels on labour 
force participation, Bane and Ellwood (1994) and Moffitt (forthcoming) were able to 
make cross-section comparisons between the states. While the policy objectives, cultural 
background and economic context within which these evaluations are made are similar, 
giving validity to the results, the overall policy framework is also the same, preventing 
investigation of alternative frameworks and policy parameters. 
There are two major approaches to international comparative studies on single 
mothers. One approach considers how the logic of single mother policy fits in with the 
wider welfare state regime, which is often perceived to be based on a male-breadwinner 
model (Lewis 1997, Duncan and Edwards 1997). The second approach analyses the 
factors underlying differences in outcomes, especially labour force participation rates for 
single mothers between countries (OECD 1993, Bradshaw et al 1996, Bradshaw et al 
2000). However, the breadth of coverage of countries means that the impact of the details 
of policy parameters are not investigated. The latter approach is mainly used in this 
paper, but the paper draws upon the gender analysis studies to set the social and cultural 
context for policy development. 
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Gender Analysis Studies 
The former approach draws upon gender analysis. Sainsbury (1997) has shown 
how gender analysis can alter the perception of a welfare state regime, especially how it 
provides independence for women (from males, though not necessarily independence 
from the state). Single mothers are perceived as lacking a male breadwinner, but have 
children to support. Sources of income are absent fathers, the labour market, the state or 
charity (including the extended family). Contrasts are made between Sweden, where all 
adults are expected to be workers, and child care facilities and parental leave are 
available for all parents, Ireland where mothers are child carers, not employed workers, 
and Japan where single mothers are effectively forced into the labour market if they are 
to survive. 
Lewis (1997) draws a distinction between the Northern European countries and 
English-speaking countries. In the former, single mothers are not singled out for separate 
policy analysis, but are treated in the context of wider family and gender policy issues 
such as child welfare, child care and employment of women. In the English-speaking 
countries, on the other hand, single mothers tend to be a controversial policy issue, with 
single motherhood being treated in moral as well as social terms, resulting in 
stigmatisation, especially of never-married mothers. These countries tend to use a male 
breadwinner model of the welfare state, where single mothers are treated as either 
workers or mothers, with the pendulum swinging towards work. The Scandinavian 
countries, on the other hand, treat all as adults as being in the labour market, resulting in 
different employment profiles over the life-cycle due to needs for child care. Citizenship 
rights dominate the political discourse, providing generous parental leave and access to 
universal care services. 
According to Lewis (1997), the outcomes for single mothers, in terms of poverty 
and social exclusion, result from these policy logics. She accepts that the structure of 
earnings is as important as labour market participation. Moreover, single mothers will 
fare better when benefits for children are generous and care services are universal. 
Equity models developed by Fraser (1994, in Lewis 1997) reflect different forms of 
support for women: the universal care-giving model with low labour force participation 
and low poverty rates and parent-worker model, where earnings are the main source of 
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income. To bring forward the result of later analysis in terms of these models, New 
Zealand is best seen as being in the process of shifting from the former, but so far not 
providing the resources for child care nor the change in social attitudes required for the 
latter model. The US, while having many of the characteristics of the latter model in 
terms labour force participation and source of income, has not embraced its implicit 
social citizenship and egalitarian aspects, resulting in social exclusion of single mothers. 
Duncan and Edwards (1997) also introduce the role of local neighbors as an often 
offsetting influence on attitudes and behaviors among single mothers to that of the policy 
regime. Each case study shows how the local neighborhood may be supportive of single 
mothers finding work through the provision of child care facilities, or may offset national 
policies on employment through the development of a community attitude to the role of 
mothering. Local opportunities for employment were also seen as important for 
influencing attitudes. 
Labour Force Participation Studies 
The major question raised in the second group of studies is whether the structure 
of the welfare regime has impacts on the prevalence of single parenthood and 
employment levels. These studies recognise that single mothers have a dilemma between 
child-rearing and bread-winning, but argue that “in general, employment is seen to be the 
surest route out of poverty and economic dependence” (OECD 1993, p.2). The studies 
then consider factors which may influence labour force participation rates such as the 
level of welfare payments relative to potential earnings levels and the impact of effective 
marginal tax rates as single mothers enter employment. Explanatory variables include 
economic data such as economic growth rates and unemployment levels, cultural factors 
often measured by employment rates for married mothers, demographic and social 
variables including the age of single mothers, their level of education and training, costs 
and availability of child care, and past marital status. 
OECD ( 1993) compared labour force participation rates between single and 
married mothers for eight OECD countries (Australia, Austria, Canada, Finland, 
Netherlands, Sweden, UK and US). In all countries there had been a growth in the 
proportion of single mother families, with the US having both the fastest growth rate and 
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highest proportion of single mothers. Employment rates for single mothers tended to be 
similar but slightly higher than for married mothers, but the participation rate for married 
mothers had increased relative to single mothers. Over three quarters of single mothers 
were in the labour force in Sweden, Finland and Austria, two thirds in US and Canada 
and half in the other three countries3. 
Given the similarity in employment rates between married and single mothers, 
explanations on labour force participation rates had first to consider factors affecting 
employment of all mothers. Both groups face similar labour force disadvantages and 
tensions between child-rearing and employment, though single mothers generally faced a 
heavier domestic burden. The availability of social assistance to single mothers was not 
seen to induce single parenthood nor to create a disincentive to full-time work. Higher 
levels of social assistance did not result in greater disincentives - in fact the countries 
with the highest levels of assistance also had the highest employment rates. The US and 
the Netherlands were highlighted, with the US having a low level of assistance and 
moderate employment rates while the Netherlands low employment and a high level of 
assistance. 
The extent and cost of formal child care was an important factor determining 
labor force participation. Finland and Sweden have an extensive system of targeted child 
care, where as the UK and Netherlands had little child care provision. The US had high 
child care costs, but offset by tax rebates, federal funding provided to the states to help 
low income families and funding related to work-fare programs. Educational attainment 
was found to be important determinant of participation, and while active labour market 
strategies were seen as successful, US experience was drawn upon to show that labour 
market programs needed to be extensive and of long duration. The OECD also found that 
single mothers were more likely to participate in the labour force if already employed 
before becoming a single mother. Teenage mothers, due to their lack of education and 
previous work experience, and those with younger children, due to greater pressure for 
child-minding, had the lowest participation rates. 
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Single Parents in New Zealand and the United States in an OECD Context 
The motivation for this comparative study is set out in Table 1, derived from 
Bradshaw et al (1996). They had extended the OECD (1993) coverage to 20 OECD 
countries, and used national academic informants4 to supply information on their home 
country’s policies policy and performance in regard to single parents5. The analysis was 
similar to the OECD (1993) except for a more detailed study of the impact of tax and 
benefit systems on the financial incentives facing single parents. Although there were 
significant differences between the countries in the proportion of single mothers in 
poverty, the major finding was that employment of the single parent substantially reduced 
their likelihood of poverty. However, this conclusion is not applicable to either the US or 
New Zealand. 
Column 1 of Table 1 shows that in 1992 the US and New Zealand clearly have the 
highest proportion of single parent families, as a percentage of all families with 
dependent children, in the OECD. There is a clear gap between the US and New Zealand 
with over a quarter of families being single parent families to the next group of northern 
European and Anglo-Saxon speaking countries at about 20 percent. In southern Europe 
the proportion of single parent families is around 10 percent, and Japan only 5 percent. 
These regional differences indicate that cultural and perhaps religious factors are 
important in determining the prevalence of single parenthood. 
Not all countries use the same definition of single parenthood. There are minor 
variations for age of dependent children, though the norm was for dependent children up 
to the age of 18. A larger problem occurs with unmarried cohabiting couples, where one 
partner, usually the male, is not the biological parent of the child. If that person shares 
income and expenditure, then most countries regard these as cohabiting couples. Both 
Norway (until 1993) and the US following a court decision in 1969, regard these as single 
parent households. In the US, London (2000) estimates that 12 percent of single mother 
welfare recipients cohabit with an unrelated man, but legitimately receive AFDC. Primus 
et al (1999) indicate that about 13 percent of single mothers cohabit and share income in 
the US. Adjusting the US definition to that of New Zealand mean that both countries 
have roughly the same share of single parent families (and Norway 18 percent). 
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In all countries, the majority of single parent families are headed by women. As 
single fathers are generally older, have higher labour force participation and less likely to 
be in poverty, most analysis concentrates on single mothers. In addition, the US welfare 
benefit, AFDC, was only available to single mothers, with the presumption that single 
fathers would be in employment. Single fathers are eligible for AFDC-UP, a programme 
for unemployed parent with dependent children. Since the development of TANF, each 
state can determine eligibility for cash assistance, and many states, for example 
Maryland, now cover all 'needy families'. 
TABLE 1 
DEMOGRAPHIC AND EMPLOYMENT CHARACTERISTICS OF SINGLE 
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Single Mothers % Employed % Married 
mothers 
employed 
Part-time Full-time Total 
13 47 60 64 
10 17 27 58 
17 44 61 77 
24 17 41 62 
10 59 69 84 
12 28 40 41 
29 41 70 80 
20 23 43 56 
24 16 40 52 
4 61 65 70 
15 43 58 46 
7 43 50 55 
15 67 82 68 
23 32 
16 52 68 61 
68 38 
13 61 74 45 
11 58 69 41 
34 53 87 54 
Child poverty 










































* Because of paucity of data, Greece has been omitted from the comparison.. 
** New Zealand added, data not strictly comparable: see text for details. 
Source: Bradshaw et aZ(1996), Bradbury and Jantti (1999 
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The next column looks at employment for both single and married mothers. From 
8 countries, OECD (1993) argued employment rates for these mothers were similar. The 
employment rate for married mothers was an indication of the socio-cultural environment 
of a country, in particular its expectations and attitudes towards employment of females. 
Thus explanations of labour force participation had to first consider factors affecting the 
employment of all women before making any separate investigation of single mothers. 
Both groups face similar labour force disadvantages and tensions between child-rearing 
and employment, although single mothers generally faced a heavier domestic burden. 
However, extending the range of countries to 20 resulted in a much greater diversity of 
employment rates both for single mothers and between single and married mothers. 
Employment rates for single mothers in the US are more than twice those of New 
Zealand, at roughly the OECD average. Single mother employment rates are equivalent 
to those of married mothers in the US. New Zealand, on the other hand, had the lowest 
employment rate for single mothers bar Ireland, and the largest differential in 
employment rates between married and single mothers. This immediately raises the 
question of whether there is anything in the structure or operation of the DPB to reduce 
employment rates for single mothers, whereas AFDCRANF would appear to be more 
neutral (or employment is seen as the prime objective for all women in the US). 
Sweden has high levels of employment for both single and married mothers and a 
system which is highly supportive of women working; Germany and Ireland have a 
relatively low level of employment for both groups, and an expectation that the mother 
will be at home to look after the children (Duncan and Edwards 1997). Japan has an 
exceptionally high level of employment for single mothers, and only a modest rate for 
married mothers: a strong version of the male breadwinner model lowers the employment 
rate for married mothers, but also provides strong stigma about single motherhood and 
receipt of social assistance (even though that assistance is reasonably generous) (Peng 
1997). 
Countries also have quite different divisions between full- and part-time work. In 
the US, full-time work dominates for both single and married mothers. In New Zealand, 
married mothers are as likely to work part-time as full-time, but single mothers who work 
are more likely to be full-time. In both countries, the low share of part-time workers 
12 
raises the issue of whether the welfare system discourages part-time work. In the UK and 
Australia, part-time work is as likely as full-time, but in the Scandinavian countries, full- 
time work is more likely. The Scandinavian employment rates are not quite as high as 
shown - in Scandinavia all parents (only one at a time for couples) are eligible for up to 
three years parental leave, with those on parental leave being regarded as in employment. 
The final columns look at child poverty, and throw some doubt on the OECD 
(1993) claim that employment is the route out of poverty. The US, with an average 
employment rate for both single and married mothers, has by far the highest poverty rate 
for children, whether brought up in single or two parent households. New Zealand, on the 
other hand, has a moderate poverty rate despite its low labour force participation for 
single mothers. In the wider OECD context, the Scandinavian countries tend to have high 
employment rates and low poverty rates for single and two-parent families, with the 
single family poverty rate in excess of the two-parent. However, the Anglo countries and 
Germany have low employment and high poverty rates. 
There is little New Zealand evidence to support the research done by Edin and 
Lein (1997) in the US to show that single mothers have a substantially larger income than 
reported, and consequentially lower poverty incidence. The groups in New Zealand who 
spend more than their income are largely farmers, the elderly and couples without 
dependent children (Stephens et aZ 1995). Edin and Lein (1997) used ethnographic 
techniques to show that a small group of single mothers in Chicago received substantial 
earnings from a variety of sources, both legal and illegal, far more than allowed under 
AFDC rules without substantial benefit abatement. A study currently being undertaken by 
Moffitt and Cherlin may be able to show whether there is widespread underreporting of 
income by single mothers. 
The poverty data, except for New Zealand, comes from an analysis of the 1995 
Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) data base by Bradbury and Jantti (1999). The poverty 
level is set at 50 percent of median equivalent household disposable income for each 
country, using the LIS equivalence scale. The New Zealand information comes from a 
similar analysis undertaken by Stephens et aZ(l995,2000), using a slightly less generous 
equivalent scale for single people and per additional children6. However, some 45 percent 
of single parent households and 50.9 percent of children are below a slightly more 
13 
generous poverty level of 60 percent of median household equivalent disposable income. 
This indicates that the DPB has kept many children from being in serious poverty, but 
still suffer the hardships from an inadequate income. 
Bradshaw et al (1996) compare poverty rates, using LIS data and 50 percent of 
median income poverty line, on the basis of whether single mothers are employed or not. 
This analysis gives credence to the claim that employment reduces the incidence of 
poverty. The largest difference is for the US, where in 1991, unemployed single mothers 
had a poverty rate of 85 percent, while those employed still had a very high rate of 30 
percent. The UK had a poverty rate of 80 percent for single mothers not employed 
compared to 27 percent for those in employment, while the Swedish differential was 10 
percent to 1.0 percent. If New Zealand is added (roughly - the sample size is too small to 
give the appropriate breakdown), then the poverty rate for single parents in full-time 
work was about 4 percent and 19 percent for those not in work. 
Scandinavia versus the British Tradition 
In an unfair contest, Bradshaw et a2 (2000) compared the Scandinavian countries 
of Sweden, Norway and Denmark - the so-called social democratic welfare states - with 
Australia, UK and New Zealand - liberal, means-tested or residual welfare states. All of 
these countries have had above average levels of single parenthood and have introduced 
significant policy changes over the last decade. The analysis concentrated on both trends 
in demographic factors influencing single parenting and the relationship between 
earnings levels, in-work and out-of-work benefits. 
The demographic analysis failed to show any clear distinction between the social 
democratic and liberal regimes. Divorce rates have stabilised, teenage fertility has 
gradually declined, and although births outside marriage have increased, with a higher 
prevalence in Scandinavia, this is due to cohabitation. Many of these ‘extra-marital’ 
children are born in stable relationships. The incidence of single parenting increased in all 
countries until 1990, but since then growth has been contained in Scandinavia but 
continued in the three Anglo countries, with the fastest growth in New Zealand. 
The initial analysis concentrated more on the similarities in trends in single 
parenting and employment between the countries, rather than the effects of policies on 
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outcomes. As shown above, the polarisation of welfare states produced a greater 
distinction in terms of poverty, with generally the Scandinavian countries having very 
low poverty rates for single mothers and Anglo-Saxon countries very high rates. 
Employment levels also varied: the Scandinavian group having far higher employment 
levels than the Anglo-Saxon countries. Benefit replacement rates were significantly 
higher in the Scandinavia countries, with generous benefit levels, especially when 
housing and child-care assistance was included. The high benefit levels and high 
employment rates raises queries over the importance of labour force incentive effects, 
and places the emphasis on cultural expectations and policy parameters. 
Implications of the International Comparisons 
This paper draws upon these last two studies, but restricts the analysis to a 
comparison between the US and New Zealand. The US stands out from its Anglo-Saxon 
cousins having an employment rate comparable to Norway, and probably Sweden and 
Denmark when adjustments are made for the length of maternity leave, but a poverty rate 
for single mothers in excess of the Anglo-Saxon countries. New Zealand has also been 
seen as an outlier, with lower employment rates, relatively high replacement rates but 
medium poverty rates for children in single parent families, explained by a relatively high 
benefit level and moderate earnings in employment. 
The expectation is that a comparison of ‘similar’ countries, with differing 
employment and poverty outcomes, may offer policy makers with more insights into 
improving policy for single parents than that based on opposites or a systematic trawl 
through inter-country data. In a two-country comparison, policy detail can be considered 
in depth along with social, economic and demographic variables. 
These international comparisons raise several issues to investigate: 
What factors have led to the high proportion of single parent households in both 
countries? As an aspect of this, has the existence of a benefit for single parents 
increased their prevalence in the population? 
What has been the impact of policy on the proportion of single parents receiving 
welfare assistance, and fiscal expenditure on single parents? 
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Why does the US have a high poverty rate for single mothers when their employment 
rate is also relatively high? And what accounts for the relatively low poverty rate in 
New Zealand, given a low employment rate for single parents? 
What is the impact on the welfare of children if brought up with a single parent, and 
is there any effect on well-being if the mother is employed or receives a welfare 
benefit ? 
Which policies, or combinations of policies, can provide employment at an adequate 
wage, while having no adverse consequences on children? 
To answer these questions, it is necessary to provide some details of the policies 
in the respective countries. As current policies are a product of not only current political 
views and issues, but also the historical development of the policy, its underlying 
objectives and assumptions about human behaviour, it is necessary to provide a brief 
review of the development of single parent policies in both countries. (For a more 
extended review see, for the US, Garfinkel and McLanahan (1986) and Mayer (1999), 
and for New Zealand, McClure (1998) and Goodger (1998). 
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SINGLE MOTHER POLICIES IN THE US AND NEW ZEALAND 
Both the US and New Zealand provide a dedicated assistance package to single 
parents in need: Assistance to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), replaced by 
Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TAW) in 1996 in the US, and the Domestic 
Purposes Benefit (DPB) in New Zealand, now part of the Community Wage scheme, as 
well as a Widows Benefit. These assistance schemes are part of a wider array of welfare 
benefits provided in both countries. This wider perspective is first provided before 
looking at the details of AFDCRANF and the DPB. 
New Zealand 
In New Zealand, welfare assistance is provided in cash7, all financed from general 
tax revenue. There is no social insurance (except for accidents) or specific contributory 
charge. The Pensions Act 1898 established the targeted nature of the welfare system, to 
which widows were added in 1911 as a ‘deserving group’. After the 1930s depression, 
the Social Security Act 1938 provided the foundation for New Zealand’s welfare state, 
with an objective “to make an end to poverty and to free dependent individuals from 
being an economic burden to relatives or friends” (quoted in Boston 1999). 
Eligibility is based initially on residency and then being part of a category of 
people likely to be in need - the elderly, unemployed, sick, invalids, widows and single 
parents, with a specific benefit dedicated to each category. Except for the universal old 
age pension, the second test of eligibility is one of need, based on an income test, with the 
test applying to the income of both partners (but not their children) in a couple 
relationship. The benefit level is the same throughout the country for each category of 
beneficiary, and is adjusted for differences in family size through payment of the family 
support tax credit (FSTC). 
The benefit level varies between the categories, based partly on labour market 
participation requirement (the rate is highest for old age pensions, then invalids, sickness, 
DPB and widows, with the unemployment benefit paying the least). The benefit level is 
designed to cover ‘normal’ living costs, and is usually uprated annually on the basis of 
movements in consumer prices. What constitutes ‘normal’ has varied: between 1972 and 
1991, beneficiaries were meant to “be able to belong to and participate in the 
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community” (Royal Commission on Social Security 1972), but since 1991 “a modest 
safety net” has underpinned the system. There is a work activity test, but until 1991 it was 
not strictly enforced. There is no time limit on duration of benefit. 
Table 3 provides a breakdown of expenditure, and trends, as a percentage of GDP. 
After pensions, the largest single item of expenditure is now the DPB, for single parents, 
although this has partly been offset by a fall in expenditure on the Widows Benefit. An 
adverse macro-economy resulted in increasing unemployment during the 1980s, shown in 
expenditure on the unemployment benefit, but with spillover effects onto other benefit 
categories (see Stephens 1999 for a more detailed explanation). 
Table 2 
Social Security Expenditure in New Zealand (as proportion of GDP) 
Benefit Type 1980 1990* 1992 1994 1996 1998 
Domestic Purposes 0.9 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.7 
Widows 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Unemployment 0.3 1.7 1.9 1.8 1.4 1.6 
Sickness/Invalid 0.4 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 .o 1.1 
Other* * - 0.7 - 1.6 - 1.9 - 2.0 - 2.0 - 1.9 
Total Income-tested 2.6 5.8 6.2 6.3 6.1 6.4 
Family* * * 1.1 1 .o 0.5 0.8 0.8 0.8 
Pensions - 6.7 - 6.7 - 7.4 - 6.5 - 5.9 - 5.5 
TOTAL 10.4 13.5 14.1 13.6 12.8 12.7 
* In 1986, all income-tested benefits were taxed and grossed up by the amount of the tax. About 10% of the 
increase in gross expenditure can be attributed to this policy. 
** Other includes orphan’s and unsupported child benefits, the second and third tier benefits (see text) and 
administration expenses. 
*** The universal family benefit was abolished 1 April 1991. From 1986, the amount covers family 
support paid to low income workers, and from 1997, the in-work benefit, the independent family tax credit. 
These categorical benefits amount to 90 percent of expenditure and provide 
passports to second and third tiers of benefit. The second tier recognises that individuals 
have different unavoidable expenditures, and may need additional assistance based on 
their own circumstances. The second tier covers above average housing costs, child-care 
subsidies and allowances for training, disability and handicapped children. The third tier 
provides ‘a safety net’ in the form of special needs grants and special benefits which are 
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designed to meet emergency and additional needs. They are income- and asset-tested, and 
account for about three percent of benefit expenditure. 
The United States 
Compared to New Zealand’s exclusive reliance upon social assistance, the US 
operates a hybrid system of income maintenance. In 1992, some 39.2 percent of income 
maintenance expenditure came from income-tested welfare, the remainder being based on 
social insurance principles. The US is noted for the extent of its reliance upon employer- 
based benefits such as health insurance and private occupational pensions as well as tax 
expenditures, with reductions in tax liability made for dependent children, health and 
education costs and mortgage repayments. These tax expenditures largely accrue to 
middle and upper income groups, giving a high degree of middle-class capture. Tax 
expenditure are not included in government expenditure, as thus excluded from Table 38. 
Another distinguishing feature of the US welfare state is its use of non-cash 
transfers such as Food Stamps and Medicaid. These means-tested programs seem to be 
based on a lack of trust that consumers (or at least low-income consumers) are the best 
judge of their own welfare and need to be directed in the form and content of at least 
some of their expenditure. In-kind payments protect the more vulnerable members in a 
household such as children from misuse of income by adults and satisfy taxpayer 
requirements over the direction of expenditure. They receive support from producer 
groups who benefit from the certainty of either spending (as with food stamps) or 
payment for treatment (Medicare). From a public choice perspective, these in-kind 
transfers are provider capture - the Food Stamp program was set up to promote the 
interests of farmers, and is operated by the Department of Agriculture, not Health and 
Human Services which run the cash transfer programs (Mayer 1999). 
The major social insurance programs and welfare programs were introduced as 
part of the New Deal in the 1935 Social Security Act. The New Deal was designed to 
revive the economy and provide full employment as a response to the 1930s depression. 
A distinction was made between those expected to work, with insurance programs 
financed from payroll taxes, and those not expected to work, who would receive means- 
tested assistance financed from general tax revenue. 







(OASDI), unemployment insurance and Medicare. OASDI provides rights-based benefits 
1980 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 
0.3 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 
0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 
0.05 0.08 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.3 
0.2 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 
0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
to retired or disabled workers and their dependants, and to survivors of insured workers, 
with payments related to past earnings. OASDI (Social Security) represents the largest 
component of the US expenditure on social welfare (Table 3). Medicare provides health 
cover to all those over 65, and can be supplemented from personal funds. Unemployment 
Insurance requires recent employment with a covered employer, and although about 90 
percent of all employed persons are covered, only about half of unemployed people 
receive unemployment insurance benefits, due to time limits for eligibility, insufficient 
earnings coverage and disqualification due to voluntary separation or job refusal. 
Table 3 
Trends in Expenditure on US Income Maintenance Programs* 
(as percent GDP) 




1.2 1.1 1.3 1.5 1.4 1.3 
4.4 4.5 4.8 4.7 4.6 4.5 
0.6 0.3 0.6 0.4 0.3 0.3 
2.9 1.7 1.9 1.5 1.5 1.5 
Source: Committee on Ways and Means (various years) 
*For comparability with New Zealand, health expenditures and health insurance such as Medicare and 
Medicaid have been omitted. All New Zealanders are covered by a tax-funded health system, though 
private supplementation is common and there is targeted assistance to low income households to pay for 
primary health care. 
**Includes expenditure on child nutrition, Stafford loans and veterans’ pensions. 
***Includes retirement and disability expenditure, farm price support, social services, veterans’ benefits. 
The means-tested social assistance programs of Aid to Dependent Children (later 
Aid to Families with Dependent Children, AFDC) and Old Age Assistance were designed 
for those not expected to work. Benefits depend upon need, not past earnings. Both 
programs were meant to wither away - Old Age Assistance due to expansion of insurance 
20 
under OASDI, and AFDC as single mothers received benefits from widow’s insurance or 
from non-custodial parents. Neither withered, due to low earnings levels during working 
age and a significant rise in the number of female-headed households due to increasing 
rates of divorce, separation and out-of-wedlock births. 
Mayer (1999) claims that “(the) major premise of the American welfare state is 
that a free labour market is the first and best defense against poverty, and that fostering 
equal opportunity in education and employment will maximize both economic growth 
and economic well-being for individual families.” More than any other OECD country, 
the US relies upon work to provide an adequate income, rather than social spending. The 
development of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), on a negative income tax basis, is 
an explicit recognition that employment earnings will not all be adequate, and need to be 
supplemented from government spending. As Table 3 shows, EITC has become a major 
component of the US welfare system, yet it maintains the logic of primacy given to 
employment income. 
The Development of Single Parent Policy in the US and New Zealand 
The original development of social assistance for single parents in both countries 
came from a need to reduce the risk of poverty among single parent families, with special 
concern over the impact of poverty on children brought up in those families. Social 
judgements have also influenced policy development. Subsequent policy developments 
have often been a reaction to unintended consequences of the original legislation. While 
the origins of single mother policies in both countries are very similar, changing 
objectives and policy responses have resulted in divergent systems. A comparison of 
Tables 2 and 3 indicates that New Zealand spends substantially more per capita on 
welfare and single parents than the US. Chart 1 (in the Appendix), beginning in 1980, 
shows how the US has curtailed the growth in numbers on AFDCRANF, with even 
bigger containment of government expenditure. New Zealand, until 1999 at least, has had 
inexorable growth in both numbers on the DPB and fiscal expenditure. To understand 
these trends, it is necessary to consider the development of policy in both countries, and 
how these are either a reaction or cause of blips in the trend lines in Chart 1. 
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The New Zealand Widows Benefit was introduced in 1911 for a ‘deserving’ 
group who had been unable to work, with many being forced to place their children in 
orphanages. Deserted women were excluded until 1938 and never-mamed mothers until 
1969, having to rely on judicially-enforced private maintenance, charitable relief or 
employment. In the US, AFDC was introduced in 1935 to replace a non-uniform set of 
mothers pensions operated by most states. The mothers pension was based on the 
principle that the mother was the best carer of her children, that most women could not be 
a home maker and breadwinner, and that private charity was insufficient to deal with the 
problem. Deserted mothers were included in most states (Crenson 1998). These 
principles were continued in AFDC, covering all sources of single motherhood, but not 
single fathers. Because of its historical origins, AFDC was run and administered by the 
states, each state sets its own benefit level, but with significant federal funding and 
federally determined entitlement rules and regulations. 
The Social Security Act 1935 had twin objectives of providing relief to people in 
need as well as preventing as many people from being in need as possible. Continued 
expansion in the number of people receiving AFDC in the 1950s, due to increased rates 
of divorce, separation and out-of-wedlock births, meant that the second objective was not 
being achieved. The result was the first War on Poverty, and the start of the switch in 
emphasis from child-rearing to employment. President Johnson wanted to provide a 
‘hand-up, not a hand-out’. 
The policy problem was not the lack of motivation of single mothers to find 
employment, but a lack of the requisite labour market skills to provide sufficient earning 
power. The policy solutions were to improve schooling in poor areas, assist poor adults 
acquire skills, revive depressed communities and improve access to health care for the 
poor with the introduction of Medicaid. Medicaid increased the attractiveness of the 
AFDC package, as did food stamps when turned into a national program in 1972 (Fraker 
and Moffitt 1988). When the increased real effective benefit level combined with a legal 
ruling that AFDC was available to cohabiting single mothers provided that the father was 
not the biological parent, caseload numbers increased from 67 percent of eligible families 
in 1967 to nearly 90 percent in 1971 (Garfinkel and McLanahan 1986). 
22 
The second war on poverty changed tack, providing incentives for single mothers 
to enter the work force with the introduction of the in-work benefit, EITC, and small 
earnings disregards for those on benefits. Work motivation problems were also addressed 
with the introduction of a requirement for single mothers with youngest child six and 
over being required to register for work. This change of emphasis to work occurred at the 
same time that a Royal Commission on Social Security (1972) in New Zealand 
recommended both an increase in the level of welfare benefits as well as the introduction 
of the DPB for all single parent families. 
The DPB was introduced at a time of changing perceptions on the employment of 
women. In 1971, 60 percent of separated and divorced women were in the labour force 
compared to 28 percent of married women (Hyman 1978). The Royal Commission on 
Social Security (1972) recommendations were based on a male breadwinner model of 
society, and the DPB was established on the basis that single mothers need not go out to 
work, but should provide full-time care for children. The structure of the DPB was 
designed to provide income adequacy rather than incentives for employment. Goodger 
and Larose 1998 argue that the DPB represents a significant contributory factor in 
accounting for the reduction in employment of single mothers whilst employment rates 
for married mothers increased. 
Garfinkel and McLanahan (1986) offer three explanations for the substantial change 




There was a compositional change in single mothers, from being predominantly white 
to being 50 percent African-American. 
A change in the cause of single-parenting from widowed to divorced, separated and 
never-married, with the latter representing the fastest growth and being younger on 
average. 
The substantial increase in married women’s labour force participation, which made it 
acceptable for women with dependent children to be in the workforce, as well as 
providing child care facilities to enable them to work. 
In New Zealand, concern over the growth of numbers and expenditure on the 
DPB initially led to queries over whether the benefit was increasing single parenthood. 
Although no evidence was found, it was recognised that more liberal divorce laws and 
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less stigma of receipt of benefit were contributory factors. It was not until the mid-1980s 
that the growing disparity between employment rates for married and single mothers led 
to a review of policy, and then in the context of a wider change in social security benefits. 
The Reagan era saw no new programs, but increased the emphasis on work by 
altering both the incentives structures and the work requirements for AFDC. As part of 
supply-side macro-economic policy, the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act 198 1 
(OBRA) lowered benefit levels in AFDC, food stamps and Medicaid (but less severely 
than Reagan wanted), and reduced the number of families eligible for AFDC by lowering 
the income level at which families became eligible. A decade later, the 1991 benefit cuts 
of roughly 14 percent fall in the real value of the DPB in New Zealand were also 
designed to provide labour force incentives as well as fiscal savings as part of a supply- 
side macro-economic policy. As Chart 1 shows, the benefit cuts plus tighter eligibility 
conditions temporarily slowed down the growth in numbers and fiscal expenditure, 
whereas Reagan’s policies in the US stopped the growth in welfare receipt and 
expenditure, despite increased numbers of single mothers. 
In both countries, there also were some positive work-force incentives. The US 
saw an easing of asset limits for food stamps and making Medicaid available to women 
with children under 6 whose family income was less than 133 percent of the poverty line. 
This provided a strong positive incentive to enter low-paying or part-time work as 
previously many welfare recipients lost access to health-care coverage when they took 
employment because their employer did not offer health insurance. The New Zealand 
Labour government had provided positive incentive effects for all beneficiaries as part of 
a radical reform of the tax system in 1986, through the provision of in-work benefits such 
as the guaranteed minimum family income and family support tax credit being extended 
to low income workers, and the extension of earnings disregards to encourage part-time 
work. 
More important for trends in welfare receipt was the strengthening of work 
requirements. Under OBRA, AFDC mothers with children three and over were required 
to undertake community work to receive their benefits. This represents a different view 
on human motivation - people do not respond sufficiently to economic incentives to 
ensure employment, due to lack of motivation or attitude, and thus had to be mandated 
into the labour market. In New Zealand, work requirements for single mothers with 
children 13 and over were first discussed in the 1991 budget, but were not proceeded with 
at that stage due to an adverse macroeconomic situation (partly induced by the benefit 
cuts). 
In 1988 Congress passed the Family Support Act, seen as a forerunner to the 
Clinton 1996 revision of welfare. The major thrust of the Act was to ensure that single 
mothers would become self-sufficient through the operation of work placement 
programs. States were given flexibility in the way that they operated their Job 
Opportunity and Basic Skills (JOBS) programs, ranging from post-secondary education 
to job search clubs or community work experience. Mayer (1999) reports that most states 
operated minimal programs and few participants received help searching for jobs. All the 
same there were several favourable reviews of the JOBS programmes. 
Gueron and Pauly (1991) and Friedlander and Burtless (1995) reviewed the 
literature which evaluated the JOBS program, especially the welfare-to-work aspects. 
They used a variety of criteria, including the change in welfare roll and welfare 
expenditure, the likelihood of permanent employment for participants and impact on 
earnings and poverty levels. Gueron and Pauly found a consistent and measurable 
increase in employment and earnings for participants, with the earnings increase more 
than offsetting the reduction in the level of welfare benefits. However, many of those 
moving off welfare remained poor. The gains were not evenly spread: the most 
employable, mainly first time welfare applicants, made little gain relative to a control 
group, while those with little recent experience gained most, even though a high 
proportion remained on welfare, and long-term recipients did not gain at all. In addition, 
both studies found that mandatory unpaid work does not achieve the objectives, though 
work experience is useful for long-term welfare recipients; that active job-search is the 
most cost-effective in terms of increasing incomes; and that education and training is 
required as well as job-search assistance to find employment which pays an adequate 
wage to avoid poverty. 
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The Clinton Years and PRWORA 
In the US, the economic recession of the early 1990s resulted in expenditures and 
numbers on AFDC starting to increase after a decade of no growth (Chart 1). Clinton 
came to office promising to ‘end welfare as we know it’, by changing the focus of AFDC 
from income support to employment. The final bill which was passed was a political 
compromise between the Republican dominated Congress and Democrat Clinton. The 
Republicans wanted to preserve traditional family values, and thus end illegitimacy and 
family breakdown, especially teen motherhood (Waldfogel 1996). The Personal 
Responsibilities part of the Act banned assistance to unwed teen mothers and their 
children, stopped assistance until paternity was established and imposed time limits on 
assistance. 
The New Zealand government used a different approach to personal responsibility 
among beneficiaries. It tried to introduce a Code of Family and Social Responsibility, 
intended to ensure a system of reciprocal obligation on those receiving assistance from 
the state. The code was not about the responsibility of the state to it citizens, but instead 
about parental responsibility to ensuring their children receive education, immunisation 
etc., with mandatory sanctions for failure to comply (Boston 1998). The approach failed 
partly because of political ineptitude. It was also at variance with the general mores of the 
population who believed that the government had not spelt out its obligations, such as a 
rapidly growing economy and adequate provision of health care. 
Prior to the passing of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act 
1996, (PRWORA) Clinton developed the ‘new federalism’, with devolution of 
responsibility from the federal government to the states. The federal government had 
power to grant states waivers to the AFDC rules to introduce experimental and pilot 
programs which were consistent with the goals of AFDC. With waivers being granted to 
43 states, ranging from time limits on welfare, greater earnings disregards before benefits 
are abated with earnings, tighter work requirements and limitations on increases in 
benefits if single mothers had an additional child, AFDC had ceased any resemblance of 
a uniform, nation-wide program. 
PRWORA is an interesting mix of strict federal mandates on the behaviour of 
single mothers, considerable flexibility in the devolution of programme design to the 
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states, subject to output-based accountability mechanisms operating via a mix of financial 
inducements and penalties at both state and individual level The final determination of 
PRWORA incorporates most of these waiver program parameters. Under PRWORA, 
AFDC was replaced by a block grant to each state called Temporary Assistance to Needy 
Families (TANF). The JOBS and Emergency Assistance programs were incorporated into 
a $16.5 billion annual block grant from the Department of Health and Human Services to 
the states. The size of each state’s grant was based on the average 1992-94 payments or 
the 1994 level of federal expenditure to each state on these programs. States could qualify 
for supplemental funds based on having high population or poverty rates compared to 
TANF funding, a contingency fund if there is high State unemployment, and welfare-to- 
work grants. Bonuses can be paid for ‘high performance’ and reductions in out-of- 
wedlock births without increasing abortion rates. 
From a New Zealand perspective, it is interesting that an operating Act did not 
have final agreement on the regulations. While there are some differences between the 
1996 law and the final set of regulations issued on April 12, 1999 (Schott et al 1999), the 
fundamental principles underlying the final TANF regulations enhance state flexibility in 
the operation and administration of TANF funds. All states have interpreted PRWORA in 
supporting work activities rather than welfare receipt. Each state has developed a range of 
regulations and programs which encourage work activities. 
TANF does not set up national rules of entitlement, but allows the states to 
determine eligibility. States continue to set benefit levels, and can determine which 
categories of families in need they will assist. Maryland, for example, provides assistance 
to all needy families, thereby effectively collapsing AFDC and AFDC-UP into a single 
program, with the same eligibility criteria. Under TANF, states can contract out the 
administration of benefits and provision of services to charitable, religious or private 
organisations, and many states have taken up this option, resulting in accountability 
issues (Liebschutz 2000). 
To help achieve the second and third objectives, States are forbidden to use the 
block grant to provide benefits to unwed mothers under 18 who do not live with an adult 
relative and who do not have high school diploma or still in school. Immigrants of less 
than five years residency are not eligible for federal funding. TANF has also set a five- 
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year time limit on receipt of benefits, with that five years applying over the life-time of 
receipt of benefits. States are allowed to exempt 20 percent of their base caseload from 
this requirement for hardship reasons. This is a recognition that some people do not have 
the skills or personality to hold down employment (Lerrnan 1998). The five year time 
limit only applies to the use of cash assistance funded from the federal government: it 
does not apply to state funded assistance or to ‘non-assistance’ such as child care and 
transportation services provided to families in work, counselling and employment 
services which support work, short-term crisis assistance or pregnancy prevention 
services. Many of the programs developed by the states are specifically labelled non- 
assistance (as an example, see the extensive use of non-assistance in Maryland’s T A W  
plan in Glendening et a2 1999). 
While TANF has given states considerable discretion in the way that they operate 
welfare in response to the receipt of the block grant, to receive the full block grant, states 
have to meet specific output targets. TANF requires that welfare recipients be engaged in 
work activities after a maximum of two years of receiving benefits, and participate in 
community service after just two months of assistance, though states can and have opted 
out of this last requirement. Work activities include: unsubsidised employment, 
subsidised public or private sector employment, work experience, on-the-job training, job 
search and job readiness assistance (for 6 weeks or longer if the state has a high 
unemployment rate). Weekly hours for work activities have risen to 30 hours per week, 
except 20 hours for those with a child under the age of six. 
States must expend a certain amount of their own funds (maintenance of effort 
rule). Before TANF, the Federal government reimbursed the states for about 55 percent 
of welfare expenditure, with the states paying the other 45 percent ($13.9 billion in 
1994). Failure to maintain the state’s expenditure level results in a reduction in the 
subsequent year’s family assistance grant. States must also ensure that work activities be 
undertaken by 25 percent (rising to 50 percent by 2002) of all beneficiary families, 
though states may exempt single parents with child under one from the work requirement. 
States are given incentives to comply with the legislation: for instance, with the 
maintenance of effort funds, states must show that they are spending 80 percent of their 
1994 non federal funds spent on AFDC on TANF, but this is reduced to 75 percent if they 
meet the work participation requirements. There are also bonuses - for states that reduce 
out-of-wedlock birth without increasing abortion rates, and a bonus for high performance 
states based on measures of employment, job retention, earnings progression and birth 
rates for females 15-17. There are also financial penalties if states fail to achieve the 
required participation rates, with the Block Grant falling by 5 percent for the first failure 
and a further 2 percentage points for each subsequent failure, and penalties in another 13 
cases, including maintaining historic level of state spending, complying with child 
support enforcement requirements or failure to submit verification reports. 
There are also penalties against individuals who refuse to work or engage in 
‘work activities’. Aid to that family must be reduced in respect of the work refusal 
period. A single parent with a child under 6 may not be penalised if she can demonstrate 
inability to find child care. In the final regulation, the degree of penalty can be made by 
the state ‘on any reasonable method’ (Schott et al 1999). 
Policies by the States 
Many states have set up an extensive array of policies designed to encourage 
work effort as well as assist families with dependent children who have a range of 
educational, psychological and addiction problems. Many states took the option of 
merging their welfare and employment offices, allowing officials to immediately suggest 
employment options rather than letting single mothers sign on to welfare. There has also 
been considerable devolution to county and district level. Many innovative policies, in 
response to local needs and issues, have been developed - in Baltimore for example, 
single mothers have been offered assistance to repair cars and had child-care arranged so 
that they can take employment at non-regular hours. 
The rapid expansion of the US economy since 1992 and the continuous fall in 
unemployment rates have resulted in lower case loads than the basis for the original 
funding of TAW. Case loads dropped by 52 percent between 1994 and 1999, and total 
federal and state expenditures on cash assistance have fallen from $23 billion in 1994 to 
$12.4 billion in 1999, but federal funding on cash assistance has remained constant at 
$16.4 billion (Lazere 2000). Many states have used the additional funds to introduce a 
range of new programs to help low-income families to obtain employment and remain in 
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work. Programs which have been developed include transportation, child care, substance 
abuse programs and services to offset domestic violence. States have not used the 
legislation for ‘a race to the bottom’, with lowering of assistance, to prevent inward 
migration of single mothers. 
However, many of the states have unspent TANF funds. Some of this may be 
from states setting up reserves for when the economy is not so buoyant as states, rather 
than the federal government, now takes the fiscal risk (and windfalls). Lazere (2000) 
indicates that while a significant number of states (18) have used all of their funds, a 
considerable proportion have funds unspent, ranging from 58 percent in Wyoming and 51 
percent in West Virginia down to 7 percent in Maryland and 3 percent in Wisconsin. All 
states achieved the 75 percent maintenance-of-effort requirement. 
However, Hernandez (2000) reported that there was considerable switching 
between funding sources, with states effectively using federal funds for state initiatives. 
He reports that New York state has taken at least $1 billion of federal funding under 
TANF (out of $6.1 billion) and used it to indirectly finance programs that appeal to 
middle-class voters and tax cuts. States use federal funding to finance welfare programs 
they used to offer, and use the released funds to pay for politically popular programs. 
While this is not illegal, it does point to problems of accountability under TANF 
regulations. The only accountability mechanisms under PRWORA appear to be 
output/outcome based (maintaining 75 percent of historic welfare spending, ensuring 
reduction in welfare rolls etc.). 
The other major initiative is the Welfare-to-Work fund, which requires matching 
state finance. The funds are to be used to move individuals into permanent unsubsidised 
employment. The list of activities is similar to the TANF work activities list, but excludes 
vocational education and schooling. It thus covers community service, job creation, on- 
the-job training, job vouchers and job retention support services. Welfare-to-work funds 
are classified as non-assistance and do not count towards the 60 month time limit. 
The DPB Review 
By the mid-1980s in New Zealand, the increased expenditure and numbers on the 
DPB, recognition of a growing disparity between married and single mother employment 
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rates and the development of full-time child care facilities led to a reappraisal of policy 
and its objectives. Increased work expectations replaced child-minding objectives., Views 
that single mothers were living adequately if modestly on the DPB, and had lost the 
motivation to work, were taking priority among policy makers. Policy for the DPB was 
complicated by the existence of a growing number of unemployed beneficiaries (mainly 
male). This group took priority in terms of enforcing employment obligations and job 
search. 
Policy makers in New Zealand had looked at the cost-effectiveness evaluations of 
the welfare-to-work programs undertaken after the Family Support Act 1988, and more 
recently at the ‘success’ of the initial AFDC waivers, especially those initiated in 
Wisconsin. An attempt to sell these policies to the New Zealand public through a Beyond 
Dependency conference (Social Policy Journal of New Zealand 1998) failed, partly 
because of the high cost compared to an academickomunity group Beyond Poverty 
conference, and partly because those coming from the US to sell the US policies such as 
Larry Mead (1996) were known for their strong views on single mothers. 
The initial work-for-welfare programs dealt with all beneficiaries, and were 
designed to improve the employment prospects of both unemployed youth and single 
mothers. They were not successful, partly due to adverse macroeconomic conditions, 
with few additional jobs created and considerable job displacement (Bertram 1988). The 
Compass program, from 1993, focused on single mothers, using individualised case- 
management in an attempt to cover the range of problems in accessing employment. The 
aim was to reduce ‘cycles of dependency’, with clients being placed in direct competition 
with others entering the labour market. Initial evaluations of the scheme have shown it to 
be cost-effective (Rochford 1997). 
In 1997-98 a review of the Domestic Purposes Benefit was undertaken. Its 
objective was to increase work attachment of single mothers through the redesign of the 
benefit parameters and entitlement conditions. Among the measures undertaken have 
been: 
A merger of the Income Support division of the Department of Social Welfare and the 
Employment Service of the Department of Labour into a new department, Work 




work tests were now combined, with case managers being better placed to marry 
benefit rights with work expectations. 
An increase in the income exemption, or earnings disregard, before benefits are 
abated against market earnings. The structure of the exemption, with an $80 per week 
disregard and abatement of 30 percent (plus tax on earnings of 15 or 21 percent) up to 
$180, and then 70 percent abatement, was designed to encourage part-time work. In 
1998, almost a quarter of those on the DPB reported extra income, with 13 percent 
receiving more than $80 per week. Gradual abatement of benefits with additional 
income reduces labour force disincentive effects but increase the number of recipients 
of the benefit. 
There was a change in the work expectations for single mothers, with a full-time 
work test for those with the youngest child over 14 (previously they had been subject 
to a part-time work test), part-time work test for those with children aged 6-13 
(previously they had to attend an annual employment-suitability interview), and a 
new mandatory annual interview for those with a child under 6. 
The work test is the same as that applied for the unemployment benefit. All recipients 
are to be work-ready, and after six months non-employment, be willing to undertake 
community work for at least 20-25 hours per week. The DPB became part of the 
Community Wage program whereby long-term beneficiaries (duration over 6 months) 
were meant to participate in community work projects, with sanctions of a reduction 
or abolition of the benefit for non-compliance. Very few organisations have joined 
the scheme, because training and mandatory reporting fall on the employer, the jobs 
are of marginal value to the employer or replace volunteers (Higgins 1999)9. 
In response to beneficiaries taking reasonable steps to find employment, the State 
took the reciprocal obligation of reducing barriers to finding and maintaining 
employment. Included in this package was an after-school care subsidy, an improved 
training incentives allowance, continued support once people had moved into 
employment and a short-term sick leave program designed to cover situations with 
sick children. 
The initial results of the change in policy emphasis seem to be moving towards 
the policy objectives. There has been a 4.3 percent fall in numbers on the DPB, and 
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increase in the proportion exiting from the DPB to work from 18 percent in 1995 to 27.3 
percent in 1999, an increase in the proportion declaring part-time employment from 15.9 
percent in 1995 to 21.6 percent in 1999, a reduction in inflows onto the benefit (though 
outflows, especially to other benefits, have also fallen), with the largest fall being for 
those with young children (Ministry of Social Policy 1999). No analysis has been done as 
to whether these changes are a direct result of the policy change or due to changes in the 
macro-economy or attitudinal effects. All the same the Ministry of Social Policy (1999) 
argued that more dramatic results will require more significant investments to offset the 
barriers to employment, especially in child care and transport costs. 
Summary 
Both countries have a benefit dedicated to single parents which has gradually 
swung from a view that the prime role for single mothers is the nurture and care of 
dependent children to one where employment is the preferred option. The change in focus 
came earlier in the US, primarily because the provision of assistance and growth in 
welfare expenditures and usage came earlier. At present, New Zealand policy seems to be 
following 10-15 years behind that of the US. 
There are significant differences. Single mother policy in New Zealand is 
complicated by the presence of unemployed beneficiaries who have a greater work 
priority. In the US, the increasing degree of devolution to the states and the range of 
initiatives they are undertaking to reduce welfare usage is making evaluation of TANF 
difficult and hard to emulate. New Zealand has rejected the personal responsibilities side 
of PRWORA, and seems to place greater emphasis on the well-being of children brought 
up by single parents. Both countries have recognised that welfare benefits and work are 
insufficient by themselves for many families caught in a potential cycle of dependency, 
and are instituting a range of social work interventions for at-risk families. The 
differences in policy objectives between the countries goes along way towards explaining 
the difference trends in case loads and welfare expenditures and employment rates for 
single mothers. 
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DEMOGRAPHY OF SINGLE PARENT FAMILIES 
A major factor affecting the dramatic change in policy towards single parents in 
both countries has been the continued growth in the proportion of families with 
dependent children headed by single parents. This section looks at that growth and some 
of the demographic and social factors which lie behind the growth. Many of the factors 
also affect the employability of single parents and the adequacy of earnings from that 
employment. 
The growth in the share of single parent families in clearly shown in Chart 2. The 
US has always had the largest share of single parent families, but the growth rate over the 
25 years from 1970 has been fastest in New Zealand. By 1995/96, 31.6 percent of 
families with dependent children under 18 years were single parent families in the US, 
and 26.7 percent in New Zealand. As noted above, the US figure is inflated by about 13 
percent due to the proportion of single-mother families living with an unrelated male 
(Primus et al 1999). Widening the net of countries to include the Anglo-Scandinavian 
comparison, one sees that the UK has also had a fast rate of growth, especially between 
1985 and 1995. However, Norway and Denmark actually had a fall in the share of single 
parent families, while Sweden stabilised its share. Part of this fall is due to favourable 
demographics, with lower numbers in the age groups with the highest incidence of single 
parenthood. 
The growth of single parenthood comes either from death of one partner, 
separation or divorce or never mamed mothers. Not all divorces and separations contain 
children, and cohabitation means that not all children born outside marriage lead to single 
parenting. New Zealand and the USA have very similar structures of single motherhood, 
as the first three rows of Table 4 show. Improvements in health care, and reductions in 
industrial accidents, have reduced the likelihood of being a widow, and it is now a minor 
cause of single parenting. The declining share of widowhood over time is shown in Chart 
3, and is largely a product of the growth in the other forms of single parenting. 
Divorce is almost twice as likely in the US as New Zealand (Table 4), resulting in 
38 percent of single parent cases, and 19 percent due to separations. New Zealand has 
almost the reverse pattern, with 30 percent of single parent cases due to separations and 
25 percent divorces. In both countries, easing of divorce laws during the 1970s raised 
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divorce rates, but since then divorce rates have stabilised (on an annual basis, the divorce 
rate is far less stable) (Chart 4). The share of separated and divorced single parents fell 
during the 1970s and 1980s in both countries, offset by a rising trend of never-married 
single mothers. Since 1990, this trend has continued in New Zealand, but the growth in 
never-married share in the US ceased (Chart 3). The New Zealand cohabitation rate is 
double that of the US, shown in Table 4 by the higher share of births outside marriage. A 
significant proportion of the never-married rate in New Zealand is a result of separation 
from cohabiting couples - more equivalent to separatioddivorce. 
Table 4 
Demographic and Social Characteristics of Single Parent Families, 
United States and New Zealand, Circa 1992 
DemoEraDhic Characteristic United States New Zealand 
Type of single mother - Never Married 
- Separated and Divorced 
- Widowed 
Divorce rate (per 1000 married couples) 
Teenage Fertility (live births per 1000) 
Births outside marriage (% of births) 
Youngest child under 5 (% 1 parent family) 
Single mother under 25 (% 1 parent family) 
One dependent child (% 1 parent family) 
Not complete secondary school (%) 
Sharing households (%) 
Ethnic composition (% non-white) 
Ethnic Incidence: African- Americamaori 
Hispanic / Pacific Island 
White 
In rented accommodation (%) 
Receiving welfare payments (%) 



































The high never-married rate of almost 40 percent of single mothers is significant 
for policy as they tend to be younger, more likely to have young children and have less 
education. Only Norway and Sweden have higher proportions of never married mothers, 
and they tend to be older. In both New Zealand and the US, a major reason for the high 
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single mother rate is the prevalence of never-married mothers - if the US had the same 
never-married rate as Australia, its overall single parent rate would fall to 21 percent, and 
New Zealand to 19%. 
Teenage fertility rates are far higher in the US (Table 4). Ex-nuptial birth rates 
rose during the 1960s as the post-war baby boom generation reached adolescence, a rise 
in pre-marital sex, poor access to birth control and a decline in marriage due to pregnancy 
(Chart 5 )  (Goodger 1998). However, even though ex-nuptial birth rates flattened off in 
the 1980s due to better contraception, the ex-nuptial birth ratio (rate per 1000 live births) 
continued to rise due to a more rapid decline in couple births. Ex-nuptial births rose 
during the 1990s, mainly due to a growth in cohabitation, often prior to marriage. 
Better contraception lies behind the decline in teenage fertility during the 1970s 
(Chart 6). In the US, this decline had stopped by 1978, and even rose again during the 
early 1990s, whereas New Zealand and most OECD countries had another ten years of 
decline. Even then New Zealand’s fertility rate exceeds that of most countries in the 
OECD who all had continuous falls in fertility during the 1970s when more reliable 
contraceptive devices became available for females. 
Singh and Darroch (2000) indicate that the high teenage fertility rate in the US 
applies to both 15-17 year olds as well as 18-19 year olds. Although the abortion rate is 
high for both age groups, the abortion ratio (proportion of pregnancies being terminated) 
is low by international standards, resulting in a high teenage birth rate. Between 1990 and 
1995 there was a substantial fall in the teenage pregnancy rate in the US (Chart 7), but as 
it was offset by an almost equal fall in the abortion rate, teenage birth rates fell only 
slightly. New Zealand, however, had an increase in the teenage pregnancy rate. This is 
largely explained by a change in the ethnic composition of the population, with a greater 
proportion of Maori and Pacific Islander populations in this age group. These ethnic 
groups have higher fertility overall as well as at younger age cohorts. There was also a 
slightly greater abortion rate, giving a slight decrease in the birth rate. The Scandinavian 
countries all had relatively low pregnancy rates, but very high abortion ratios, giving very 
low teenage birth rates. 
Despite the higher teenage fertility, the US has a slightly lower proportion of 
mothers under 25 (Table 4), but the same proportion with a child under five - both factors 
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which the OECD studies have found to be significant explanators of labour force 
participation. The proportion of single parent families with one child is comparable to the 
OECD average, but both countries have an above average number of families with 3 or 
more children. Larger family size makes child care more difficult and increases the level 
of domestic responsibility. Both countries had a very high proportion of single mothers 
who did not complete secondary school, implying a lack of labour market skills. 
The one factor which stands out in Table 4 is the strong ethnic impact of single 
parenting in both countries. In New Zealand, 48 percent of single parents are non-white, 
and a third in the US. Chart 8 shows how the share of Pakeha (European) single parents 
has fallen in New Zealand, offset by a rise in Maori and Pacific Islander groups (and 
more recently, Asiatic immigrants). Maori and Pacific Island families have higher 
fertility rates and a younger age structure. In the US, the racial mix of single parents has 
not significantly altered during the past 20 years, although there has been some growth in 
the Hispanic share. 
In African-American families, over 64 percent are headed by a single parent and 
43 percent of Maori families (Table 4). Whilst it is tempting to argue that extended 
family structures in these ethnic groups may make this high incidence less of a concern 
for employment and child-minding, only 22 percent of US single parents share and 13 
percent in New Zealand. Before any conclusion can be made that single parenting is an 
ethnichacia1 issue in both countries, one would need to standardise for other factors 
resulting in high single parenthood - age structure (both Maori and African-Americans 
are younger on average); income levels and unemployment rates (both groups have high 
unemployment and relatively low average incomes); and education levels. 
The incidence for the two groups who emigrated for employment and standard of 
living reasons - Hispanics in the US and Pacific Island peoples in New Zealand - is above 
average. The incidence for ‘White’ people in the US is also very high, and still above that 
of any other OECD country, whereas the New Zealand ‘white’ (Pakeha in local terms) is 
not really different from the other OECD countries. In all ethnic groups, there has been a 
rise in the incidence of single parenting (Chart 9). 
The final two rows of Table 4 are non-demographic. Over half of single parent 
families are in rented accommodation, far greater than the average in both countries. 
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Rented accommodation tends to lack security of tenure, is often of poor quality or of high 
cost. Low cost accommodation tends to be removed from areas of employment, requiring 
high transport costs to obtain and maintain employment. While US low cost rentals are 
often inner city, in dilapidated older areas of towns, with low skill employment moving to 
the suburbs (Wilson 1998), New Zealand’s inner city areas have been gentrified, with 
employment in the city and low cost rent either in poor outer suburbs or in rural areas. 
Policies in regard to housing costs can also have a significant influence on 
standards of living. Bradshaw et aZ (1996) indicates how housing costs represent a major 
item of regular expenditure. Both New Zealand and the US provide housing subsidies to 
offset the cost of housing, with these subsidies being related to income levels. Thus 
abatement of the subsidies, especially when combined with other targeted assistance, may 
have a significant impact on the decision to work or to increase work effort. 
In New Zealand, the housing assistance is available to all forms of tenure, and is 
based on a combination of income level and housing costs (with an allowance for 
mortgage repayment). The subsidy is equal to 70 percent of the difference between rent 
levels and a quarter of income, subject to a ceiling. It is paid in cash, and not tied to 
housing expenditure (except for beneficiaries who are in accommodation rented from the 
state, where the net rent is subtracted from the benefit at source). Some 84 percent of 
single parent beneficiaries receive this accommodation supplement. Stephens et aZ(2000) 
shows that poverty rates for single parents increases substantially after adjusting the 
poverty measure for housing costs. Despite the housing subsidy, single parents pay, on 
average, higher (gross) housing costs than the rest of the population. 
In the US, assistance tends to be provided at the State level. There are several 
programs operated at federal level to assist housing needs of low-income householders. 
As expenditure on these has been capped, not all households who qualify for assistance 
can receive it. Rental assistance reduce tenants’ rent payments to 30 percent of their 
income, after a range of deductions, with the Government paying the remainder of the 
rent. Bane and Ellwood (1994) claim that about a quarter of welfare recipients receive 
housing benefits, either through living in subsidised public housing or through housing 
assistance. 
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Based on Committee on Ways and Means (1998) data, some 43.1 percent of 
single mothers were on welfare in 1996, down from 49.3 percent in 1992. As expected 
with the parameters of AFDC, only 2.2 percent of the caseload was in full-time work, and 
a very low 4.2 percent declaring part-time work with receipt of AFDC. Dickert et al 
(1998) argue that 76 percent of eligible single-parent families receive AFDC. In New 
Zealand 84 percent of single mothers receive a benefit (Goodger 1998), many of whom 
receive assistance whilst in part time work. The take-up rate of the DPB is very high - 
Goodger (1998) calculated that more single parents receive benefits (including a widows 
and unemployment benefit) than exist on the basis of a census population count". 
Summary 
There are great similarities in the demographic structure of single parents between 
the US and New Zealand. In both countries, over a quarter of all families with dependent 
children are headed by a single parent, normally the mother. There is a strong ethnic bias 
to single parenting, and a growth in the proportion of never-married single mothers and a 
decline in the proportion of widows. Demographic factors cannot explain the different 
outcomes in terms of fiscal expenditure, employment levels or incidence of poverty 
between the two countries. The ethnic incidence and composition however partly 
explains why the two countries have a high incidence of single parenting. All the same, 
the incidence of single parenting among whites in the US still exceeds that of any other 
country, while the New Zealand white incidence is typical of other Anglo and 
Scandinavian countries. 
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WELFARE POLICY AND POVERTY ALLEVIATION 
The major rationale behind the provision of welfare benefits to single parents was 
to alleviate the prevalence of poverty among single parents. Both countries had found that 
reliance upon charitable aid, child maintenance from fathers and extended family support 
had been insufficient to remove poverty and the stigma of being brought up in a single 
mother household (Crenson 1998, McClure 1998). In many instances, the threat of 
poverty resulted in children being fostered or adopted out, or being placed in orphanages, 
with adverse effects on child development. The provision of AFDC and the DPB and 
Widows Benefit was designed to provide single mothers with an income adequate for 
them to look after their child without the threat of poverty. 
The data in the final column of Table 1 indicated that the poverty alleviation 
objective had not been achieved, especially in the US where three-fifths of children in 
households headed by a single mother were below the LIS poverty measure of 50 percent 
of median household equivalent disposable income. One-fifth of New Zealand children in 
single parent households were poor after the operation of the tax and benefit system. In 
both countries the poverty rate for single mother households greatly exceeds that of 
children in two-parent households, with the poverty incidence for all children exceeding 
that of other family types, including the elderly (Table 5).  
This relatively high incidence of poverty among children in the US also exists at 
the 60 percent of median equivalent household disposable income poverty line. However, 
there is a significant jump in the incidence of poverty in New Zealand, especially for 
children in single mother households. Stephens et aZ(2000) show that many New Zealand 
benefit levels are in between the 50 and 60 percent thresholds, explaining the large 
increase in poverty for those dependent upon benefits, including the elderly. The US 
benefit level, however, is substantially below even the US poverty measure, which is 
some 35 percent below the LIS international standard (Citro and Michael 1995). 
There are potentially two reasons for the high poverty incidence for single 
mothers: first, a high incidence of low pay, and second, a welfare system which does not 
provide a benefit sufficient to eliminate poverty for those not in employment. The second 
half of Table 5 investigates this. 
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Table 5 
Incidence of Poverty Among Children, USA and New Zealand, circa 1996 
Family Type United States New Zealand 
50 % Median Disposable Income % 
All children 26.3 
Children with Single Mothers 59.6 
Children with 2 Parents 16.7 
Elderly 14.9 
All Family Types 20.7 
60 % Median Disposable Income 
All children 34.4 
Children with Single Mother 
Children with 2 Parents 
Elderly 
All Children US Poverty Measure 
Market poverty rate 23.6 
Disposable Income poverty rate 16.1 
Poverty Reduction Eff - Incidence 31.8 
- Poverty Gap 61.8 
Children-Single Mothers 
Market poverty rate 
Disposable income poverty rate 46.1 
Poverty Reduction Effectiveness 
Work Force Incidence, Single Mother 




















Beneficiary 59.2 (19.2) 
Source: Committee of Ways and Means (1998), Stephens et aZ(2000) 
Using the US poverty definition, based on market income, some 23.6 percent of 
all children (in both single and two parent households) were poor, with this reducing to 
16.1 percent after the operation of the tax and benefit system (excluding medical 
assistance). The effectiveness of the tax and transfer system in reducing poverty is 31.8 
percent". In New Zealand, at the more generous 50 percent poverty threshold, almost the 
same number of children were poor based on market income, however, the number poor 
after the operation of the tax and transfer system was much lower at 7.4 percent, 
indicating a far greater poverty reduction efficiency in New Zealand, due to more 
generous assistance to families with dependent children12. 
The market poverty rate for all children in the US, at the 50 percent threshold, 
would probably be far higher than the New Zealand 26 percent. Given the overall greater 
employment level of females in the US, especially single mothers, the implication is a far 
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greater incidence of low pay in the US. Whiteford (1997) provides confirmation, showing 
that the US has a far greater incidence of low pay and greater earnings inequality among 
females than New Zealand. 
When attention is placed on children in single parent families, the disposable 
income poverty rate in the US is three and a half times as great as the New Zealand 
estimate. The poverty rate based on market income in New Zealand is a very high 77 
percent, indicating the lack of employment among single mothers (unfortunately there is 
no comparable estimate for the US). Although there is a very high poverty reduction 
effectiveness from the operation of the transfer system, the lack of market income still 
provides an above poverty incidence. Jensen and Eggebeen (1994) claim that welfare 
payments in the US in 1989 only brought 29.5 percent of rural and 37.6 percent of urban 
children who were 50 percent below the poverty line, on a pre-tax income basis, above 
the US poverty line. 
The final section compares poverty based on work force participation for single 
mothers. Again the figures are not directly comparable due to the different poverty 
measures. But the results show that full-time work is the best solution to poverty. The US 
has a relatively high poverty rate for those in full-time work, and indication of the low 
pay and earnings inequality. The New Zealand figures indicate that most single mother 
families, if in full-time work, avoid poverty. The beneficiary figure is estimated, as the 
data source is too small to provide reliable estimates. 
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WELFARE POLICY AND CASELOAD TRENDS 
This section investigates the factors leading to changes in welfare caseload, with 
special attention given to the impact of policy on both the incidence of single parenting as 
well as caseloads. In the US, a substantial amount of research has been undertaken on 
trends in caseloads and the incentive effects of the welfare system (see Mayer 1999 for a 
review), but very little research has been done in New Zealand, and then mainly on the 
unemployment benefit rather than the DPB (Stephens 1999, Maloney 1997). 
Trends in case loads and expenditure are a function of the demographic factors 
affecting single parenting, the proportion of those single parents eligible to receive a 
welfare benefit due to the entitlement rules, the proportion of those eligible who take-up 
the benefit, the level of the benefit plus any incentive effects from provision of the benefit 
or its level and eligibility parameters. Macro-economic variables, such as economic 
growth rates and unemployment levels, influence real earnings levels and job 
opportunities, affecting the proportion of those eligible to take-up a welfare benefit. 
Policy changes, partly in reaction to caseload and expenditure level trends, operate 
mainly through changes in entitlement rules or benefit levels, but may also influence 
social attitudes. Social norms, values and cultural attitudes affect all of these variables, 
but are very difficult to measure. 
Moffit (1999) argues that in the US, demographic influences, particularly growth 
in the proportion of single mother families, have been the main contributor to long-term 
trends in caseloads and real welfare expenditure (AFDC, food stamps and Medicaid) per 
head of population. In the short-run, changing macro-economic conditions have meant 
that fluctuations in participation rates have been equally important. Policy effects, which 
the above analysis indicated as being significant, were not considered important. In New 
Zealand, demographic factors also dominate the long-term trend, though increasing take- 
up rates among those eligible has also increased caseloads along with adverse 
macroeconomic conditions reducing employment rates for single parents. Policy effects, 
especially the 1991 benefit cuts, also had an important impact on expenditure trends 
(Chart 1 and 11). 
The significant differences in trends in real expenditure and case loads on AFDC/ 
TAW compared to the DPB in New Zealand since 1980 were shown in Chart 1. There 
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was a continuous growth in both numbers and expenditure in New Zealand, although 
there was a small reduction in expenditure and a flattening off of numbers in 1991. On 
the other hand, expenditures and numbers on AFDC remained constant between 1980 and 
1989, with a small increase to 1994, and thereafter a fall. By 1999, numbers and 
expenditure were substantially below the 1980 level, with a further 11 percent fall in 
numbers on TANF in 1999. By contrast, 1999 saw the first fall in numbers on the DPB, 
with a 2.6 percent cut, but total numbers were 300 percent higher than 1980. 
Starting at 1980 and concentrating just on AFDCRANF expenditure distorts the 
US picture, for three reasons: 
1. By 1980 the major growth in case load had already occurred. In 1970, the average 
number of families enrolled in AFDC was 1.9 million, by 1975, 3.3 million and 1980 
3.6 million, and remained at roughly that level until 1989. An increase in number of 
single parent families was the major contributor. There was also an increase in the 
take-up rate of the benefit, as stigma related to the receipt of benefits declined (Fraker 
and Moffitt 1988). This rapid growth in case load led to the revision of US policy, 
away from child-rearing to workforce activity, and to fiscal savings rather than 
poverty alleviation. 
2. Since 1980, the major growth areas in expenditure has been in programs which relate 
to AFDC - Food Stamps, Medicaid and EITC -rather than AFDC. Chart 10 shows the 
relative growth of expenditure on Food Stamps compared to AFDC, with extremely 
rapid growth in EITC expenditure during the 1990s. Growth in Medicaid expenditure 
has been far more rapid, with total expenditure now exceeding that of all the other 
means-tested programs. These programs are politically more acceptable, encouraging 
‘desirable’ consumption, while EITC provides appropriate work incentives. They 
cover a wider audience than just single mothers, so trends are influenced by the wider 
eligibility criteria. There has been a substantial growth in the number of participants 
in the Food Stamp program, rising from 16 million in 1975 to 25.5 million in 1996, 
partly due to population growth, but also a higher proportion of the population are 
eligible to receive food stamps. As part of PRWORA, eligibility for Food Stamps and 
Medicaid was relaxed as people entered the work force. However, the operation of 
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TANF by state offices has often led to a decoupling of eligibility for the different 
programs which has lowered the take-up rate. 
3. Many policies to contain expenditure and growth in take-up of AFDC had been 
already enacted. Average benefit levels in the AFDC program fell substantially 
between 1970 and 1980, with the average state real benefit level in 1980 being 40 
percent lower than 1970 (Chart 11). Although AFDC expenditure fell, standards of 
living for welfare recipients were not as adversely affected due to the interaction 
between the AFDC and Food Stamp programs: AFDC benefits count as income for 
Food Stamps, so a cut in AFDC benefits increases Food Stamp payments - Mayer 
(1 999) reports that average AFDC benefits per family declined by 42.2 percent 
between 1972 and 1992, but the real value of food stamps increased by 37.6 percent, 
giving a combined fall of 26.2 percent in the combined food stamps plus AFDC 
benefit level. 
The Macro-Economy 
The level of macro-economic activity influences both the availability of 
employment opportunities for single mothers moving into the labour market as well as 
affecting the ability to finance welfare benefits from tax revenue. As single mothers often 
reside in specific localities where employment trends may differ from the national trend, 
or have a different mix of skill and work experience than the national average, local 
employment effects also have to be considered. Chart 12 shows the national trends from 
1980 in the growth rate of real GDP and the unemployment rate in both countries. 
In New Zealand, the 1980s saw a period of substantial economic reform, with the 
removal of most import protection and considerable deregulation of most sectors of the 
economy. Exchange rate over-shooting and poor reform sequencing pushed the economy 
into recession, resulting in low and sometime negative economic growth and rapidly 
increasing unemployment, especially for the unskilled, youth and Maori (Dalziel 1999). 
Exacerbating the increase in unemployment during the 1980s was a demographic blip of 
15-19 year olds: numbers in this age group, who traditionally have a high unemployment 
rate (as well as single parenting) increased by 17.5 percent. It is this economic recession 
which is a significant contributor to the fall in employment rates for single mothers 
45 
between 1986 and 1991 (Chart 13). The fall was particularly large for full-time workers 
among Maori and Pacific Islanders, and relatively small for Europeans. 
The 1991 benefit cuts exacerbated an economic recession. The subsequent 
recovery lowered the level of unemployment and was a significant factor behind the 
increase in employment of single mothers to 1996. The increase was largest for Maori 
and Pacific Island ethnic groups, and both part-time and full-time employment increased. 
Employment of partnered mothers also rose, from 58 percent to 65 percent over the 5 
year period, again indicating the impact of economic activity on employment rates. 
In the US, case loads have remained roughly constant for most of the 20 year 
period, despite increasing numbers of single mothers. Employment rates for single 
mothers in the US has always been high, but have increased since 1981, especially part- 
time employment (Chart 13). Despite the economic recession of 1991, employment levels 
actually increased in 1991. Case loads also rose, indicating that the demographic factors 
of more single mothers outweighed the employment effect. The continued economic 
expansion since 1992 has resulted in an increase in employment rates of 66 percent in 
1996, and 68 percent in 1998. 
Mayer (1999) reports on several studies using cross-section time series data, by 
state, to estimate caseload effects. She concludes that these studies find that increases in 
the unemployment rate (of 1 percentage point) led to a much greater increase in AFDC 
caseloads of 3-5.9 percent. Use of the unemployment rate may not pick up the dynamics 
of the labour market, with declines in low-skilled manufacturing jobs during the1980s, 
which welfare recipients often move into, while there was overall employment growth. 
This may explain Moffitt’s (1999) finding that the cyclical sensitivity of the AFDC 
caseload has increased through time. 
The Council of Economic Advisers (2000) made comparisons of changes in 
caseloads between 1993-96 when waivers to AFDC were being introduced, and when the 
economy was in a recovery phase with strong economic growth, and 1996-1999, when 
PRWORA was operating alongside a continued strong economy. For the period 1993-96 
they argue that the improved labour market was the main cause of decline in welfare 
caseloads, accounting for between 26-36 percent of the decline. However, the improved 
labour market only accounted for 8-10 percent in the later period. In the state of 
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Maryland, where there has been an about average case load drop, and an above average 
fall in unemployment rate, RES1 (1999) has argued that the majority of the caseload 
decline is due to welfare reform, and virtually none to the improved economy. However, 
their model does not seem to specify the demand for labour aspect of the economy, and 
thus its results must be subject to considerable error. 
The Council found that policy impacts were very important. Lower cash welfare 
benefits were significant in the 1993-96 period, accounting for 6-22 percent of caseload 
decline, but only 1-5 percent in the later period. Program reform, which refers to waivers 
in the 1993-96 period, and PRWORA in the 1996-99 period, accounted for 12-15 percent 
from waivers and 33 percent from PRWORA. Reductions in the minimum wage between 
1993 and 1996 increased caseload by 10 percent, as work was made less attractive, while 
the rise in the minimum wage in the 1996-99 period resulted in a 10 percent fall in 
caseload. 
Other studies have picked up the effect of state waivers to the AFDC program 
parameters, and these argue that waivers have decreased caseloads by between 5.1 and 15 
percent (Mayer 1999). However, there are significant difficulties in measuring the impact 
of waivers as they may be anticipated or their effects may be delayed. Moffitt (1999) 
argued that waivers have the biggest influence on women with relatively little schooling, 
reducing AFDC participation and increasing work effort, but with no significant 
improvement in earnings. 
As noted above, neighbourhood and individual skill effects need to be taken into 
consideration. In both countries, during the 1980s there was a considerable retrenchment 
in the manufacturing sector, particularly in unskilled and semi-skilled jobs. New job 
growth has either been high skilled technology based jobs or unskilled employment in the 
service sector, often with non-standard hours of work. The new employment has also 
been in different locales to the traditional manufacturing employment, providing 
transportation difficulties. In New Zealand, the new jobs are in the city centres, while 
single mothers tend to reside in the cheaper, outlying suburbs. Waldegrave and Stuart 
(1997) indicated that many single mothers, after the benefit cuts and increases in net state 
rental costs, moved into rural areas. They could achieve a modest standard of living, but 
with no real prospect of future employment. In the US, as the Baltimore example shows, 
47 
the new jobs are in the suburbs, but the single mothers are located in the city centres. This 
dislocation may well limit the impact of macro-economic policy to increase employment 
in the absence of offsetting policy such as transportation facilities and retraining. 
Incentive Effects in the Benefit System 
Any welfare benefit changes economic incentives in the choice between paid 
employment, non-paid work at home and leisure. The traditional economic model based 
on a work-leisure choice, or the job-search model, does not capture the reality of the 
choices faced by a single mother (or any parent faced with the dilemma of child-rearing 
or employment) - leisure is not the option to work. However, this may just change the 
nature of the choice faced by single mothers, and is a significant factor lying behind the 
high labour supply elasticities found in the empirical literature for women. An alternative 
theory, based on institutional and structural features of the labour market, does not give 
firm predictions to the impact of the benefit system on the worwwelfare choice (Wilson 
1 996). 
It should be noted that incentive effects may be dominated by entitlement rules 
for receipt of benefits. Entitlement rules, such as a requirement for work activity or a time 
limit on benefit receipt place a constraint upon behaviour. There are two parts to the 
work-leisure and job search models13. First, there is the decision to enter the labour 
market based on the relationship between the benefit level and earnings when in 
employment (the benefit replacement rate). An increase in the benefit level relative to 
earnings should increase the attractiveness of being on the benefit relative to work effort. 
The magnitude of the effect depends upon empirical measurement. Consideration must 
also be given to the reservation wage - a wage below which the individual will not work. 
Each person’s reservation wage is influenced by the level of their past earnings and the 
structure of wages, especially in the bottom quintile, including the minimum wage. 
Second, there is a decision about the level of work effort, or whether to 
increaseheduce work levels, based on the increase in net income from the additional 
work (the effective marginal tax rate - EMTR). Higher EMTRs, especially those 50-70 
percent plus, are likely to make additional work effort not worthwhile. High EMTRs are 
likely to occur from either a deliberate attempt to abate benefits quickly with additional 
earnings or the interaction of different, uncoordinated welfare programmes, each with 
their own criteria for abatement with earnings. 
The data in Table 6 show some of the incentive effects incorporated into the US 
and New Zealand benefit systems for single mothers. Most of the US data refers to the 
state of Pennsylvania which the Committee of Ways and Means (1998) regards as a 
typical US state, with payments close to the median state. There is a significant range of 
payment levels between the states, lower in the south and generally higher in the north- 
east. In 1996, for a single mother with one child, AFDC/TANF payments in 1996 ranged 
from $60 per month in Mississippi and $72 in Louisiana to $167 in Maryland, $215 in 
Pennsylvania, $352 in New York city and $438 in Vermont. It was feared that PRWORA 
would result in a race to the bottom a general lowering of benefit levels. While some 
states have not adjusted benefit levels fully for inflation, in general benefit levels have 
been maintained and even increased, due to the surplus of funds that the states have 
resulting from the large fall in case loads. 
As explained above, the incorporation of Food Stamp benefits offsets some of 
the discrepancy in benefit levels between the states. When Food Stamps are added, the 
disposable income of a single parent with one child was $577 in New York and $385 in 
Pennsylvania. Using purchasing power parities to convert New Zealand benefit levels to 
US currency14, the New Zealand benefit level is less than that of New York, but 
substantially above that of Pennsylvania. 
The absolute income level indicate that the New Zealand system is, on average, 
more generous than that of the US. However, labour market decisions are based on a 
comparison of earnings in work compared to the level of the benefit, which requires 
information on the level and structure of earnings in both countries. Whiteford (1997) 
indicates that the US has a very high incidence of low pay with over 32 percent receiving 
less than two-thirds of median earnings in that country, compared to just over 20 percent 
in New Zealand. This low pay is also age related, with over 60 percent of under 25s in the 
US receiving low pay, compared to 40 percent in New Zealand. The gap between the 
lowest decile and the median is far wider in the US, though by international standards, 
New Zealand has a substantial gap. As Whiteford (1997) comments, this earnings data 
indicates that any given absolute benefit level would produce a higher replacement rate in 
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the US than New Zealand. Adjustment would have to be made for the impact of taxes, in- 
work benefits and other services. 
Table 6 
Incentive Structures in the Welfare Systems, USA and New Zealand 
circa 1995 (US - Pennsylvania unless otherwise mentioned) 
Measure United States New Zealand I 
Not Earning - New York / Wellington 577 
- Pennsylvania 385 
58 
42 
Benefit replacement rate Single Parent 1 child, all assistance 
- 0.5 av. male earnings 
- 1.0 av. male earnings 
Average Effective Tax rate Single Parent, one child aged 7 
- 0.5 to average male earnings 
% change disposable income on becoming single parent 
From single person on benefit 
earnings 
From unemployed couple separating- father 
From couple - 0.5 av. male earnings-father 
- not working to 0.5 av. male earnings 55 
61 
58 
From single person on 0.5 av. male -22 
17 
- mother and child 36 
76 
- mother and child 1 
I 






-child 3, not working to 0.5 av. male earn 
Source: adapted from Bradshaw et a2 1996, Whiteford (1997), Committee on 










Table 6 shows the level of the benefit replacement rate for a single person 
with a child aged 7, thereby omitting child-care costs. The benefit replacement is 
calculated by comparing the net benefit (including food stamps in the US) that person 
would receive if solely dependent upon a benefit compared to the level of disposable 
income they would receive if half average and average male earnings. Half average male 
earnings is about 70 percent of average female earnings in both countries, and is thus 
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reasonably representative of jobs that single mothers would be expected to receive if they 
enter full-time employment. 
At half average male earnings, the New Zealand replacement rate of 71 percent 
significantly exceeds that of the US (58 percent). At average earnings the differential in 
replacement rates is less, but still positive. New Zealand has a high personal income tax 
rate at low to moderate earnings (Stephens 1993), and the earnings level is too high for 
in-work assistance. In the US, in-work assistance and tax expenditures reduce the US tax 
rate, increasing in-work take home pay relative to the benefit level. This lowers the 
differential with net earnings in New Zealand. It is tempting to use this results to argue 
that incentives are important - the employment rate differential is explained. 
However, when a wider comparison is made of OECD countries, it was found that 
there was little connection between the level of benefit, as measured by the benefit 
replacement rate, and proportion of single parents receiving welfare payments. Sweden 
had high benefit levels, but also high employment rate of 70 percent, while Germany had 
a comparable replacement rate but only 40 percent employment. New Zealand and Japan 
had roughly comparable replacement rates, but Japan has an employment level of 87 
percent and New Zealand, in 1991, 27 percent. Employment levels in the US are 
marginally below those of Sweden and Norway, but the benefit replacement rate is less 
than half. As Bradshaw et aZ(l996, p.7 1) conclude: 
‘the pattern of financial incentives is not a sufficient explanation for variations in the 
labour supply of lone mothers. There appears to be no simple relationship between 
replacement rates and the proportion of lone parents working outside the house, nor 
is there a relationship between marginal tax rates and the proportion working full- 
time.” 
The average effective tax rate (AETR) estimates the impact on net disposable 
income of moving into the work force - from no earnings to half average male earnings, 
and from 0.5 to average male earnings. The calculations are made for a single parent with 
one child aged 7, and the former calculation is also made for a single mother with a child 
aged three. These average effective tax rates are considered more realistic options facing 
a single mother than the usual EMTR calculation based on a small increment of earnings. 
The AETR incorporates the impact of withdrawal of benefit with earnings, any positive 
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tax effects, the abatement of other assistance such as child care allowances and food 
stamps with earnings, but not the loss of Medicaid or housing assistance. 
For a single parent with a seven year old, the AETR in New Zealand for the 
move into the work force at half average earnings is far higher, reflecting the much 
higher replacement rate. From half-to-average earnings, the AETR is higher in the US, a 
consequence of the continued presence of EITC at that income range, and its abatement 
with earnings. The AETR is higher for a single parent with a three year old. The impact is 
due to child care: the single mother in work is assumed to pay for child-care while the 
mother not earning does not use paid care. Net child care costs are slightly higher in the 
US than New Zealand. In both countries a recognition of the importance of child-care, 
including after-school care costs on the decision to enter and remain in work has been 
recognised with the provision of additional assistance to offset these costs. When 
compared with the Scandinavian countries, net child-care costs are still very high. 
Chart 14 depicts the same type of information of moving into the work force, but 
for a single parent with two children, and concentrating on the net benefit which is paid 
as a percentage of average earnings in both countries. The chart shows the much higher 
net benefit in new Zealand when there is no earnings. In both countries there is some 
gradual abatement of the net benefit as single mothers take on part-time earnings. At only 
15 percent of average earnings, the US benefit has been cut substantially, but this fall 
stabilises as the impact of EITC affects disposable income (Chart 15). The real fall off in 
net benefit occurs at about half average earnings, and from 60 percent of average 
earnings, single mothers are net tax payers. In New Zealand, the high EMTR cut in at less 
than 30 percent of average earnings, but because the net benefit is that much higher, 
positive tax payments do not occur until 90 percent of average earnings (Chart 16). 
During the 1990s, both countries witnessed significant policy attempts to 
improve incentives in order to increase work effort among single mothers. The EITC in 
the US increases in-work income relative to welfare benefits, thus lowering the 
replacement rate. EITC initially increases with income (Chart 15). This lowers the 
EMTR, and may even make it negative, encouraging part-time as well as low-wage full- 
time work effort. The EITC gives a maximum tax credit of $2353 for a family with one 
child and $3888, or $75US per week, for a family with 2 or more dependent children, 
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before abating with income at 20 percent and phasing out at $31000. All personal income 
tax paid is refunded to recipients of the EITC, and much of the payroll tax levied on those 
individuals (Johnson and Lazere 1998). In addition, 13 states have now piggy-backed a 
state EITC onto the federal EITC, with the state EITC often set so as to refund state 
income tax paid (Johnson 1999). 
The EITC considerable more generous than New Zealand’s only true in-work 
benefit, the IFTC, introduced in 1997, which provides $15 per week per child, is only 
available for single mothers if they work more than 20 hours per week, and abates at 18 
percent (plus tax of 21 percent) from $20,000 to $27,000, and then at 30 percent (plus tax 
of 21 percent). The FSTC is also provided to beneficiaries with dependent children as 
well as low-income workers. As such it does not alter replacement rates, and thus is a 
partial in-work benefit. The greater generosity of FSTC is shown in Chart 16. 
Other positive labour market incentives have been provided. In New Zealand, the 
income exemption, or earnings disregard, was increased in 1996 from $60 per week to 
$80 per week, though tax at 15 percent on all earnings was paid. Abatement of the benefit 
with additional earnings used to be 30 percent between $60 and $80, and then 70 percent 
(plus tax of 21 percent, giving an EMTR of 91 percent). From 1996 the 30 percent 
abatement area increased to $180 per week, giving an incentive to move into part-time 
work, providing additional income as well as permitting child-rearing functions. In 1998, 
almost a quarter of DPB recipients reported extra income, with 13 percent receiving more 
than $80 per week. This gradual abatement of benefits with additional earnings provides 
part-time labour force incentives, but increases case loads and fiscal costs. 
The 1991 benefit cut was to provide labour force incentive effects as well as being 
ideological, and to provide fiscal savings. Maloney (1997) calculated that 40-80 percent 
of employment growth after 1991 could be attributed to the benefit cuts, while Chiao and 
Walker (1992) estimated that labour supply of beneficiaries would increase by 2.2 
percent. Both used high labour supply elasticities by international standards. There was a 
cessation of growth in numbers on the DPB, but changing eligibility requirement were as 
important as the benefit reduction. The introduction of a mandatory interview with the 
Employment Service from 1997 had a similar impact on numbers. Moffitt (1992) 
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reviewed the US literature on incentive effects of the welfare system. Most studies 
showed a small, but definite impact on labour supply from the provision of welfare. 
In the US, eligibility for Medicaid for single mothers moving into work was 
maintained for a year after entry, offsetting a significant barrier to entry. Equally, 
providing Food Stamps to those in work but receiving less than 133 percent of the US 
poverty line raises the attractiveness of low-income work. 
Raising the national minimum wage has been undertaken in both countries, and 
should make work more attractive, although the higher wage cost may make some impact 
on labour demand. While there is a debate about the impact of minimum wages on 
employment, most studies find little or no effect (Card and Krueger 1995). However, 
Turner (1999) shows that most low wage workers are not single mothers, but youth 
supplementing a family income which is above the poverty line. Stephens (1996) showed 
a similar result for New Zealand, with most low-income individuals living in families 
with average income levels. 
Incentives to Single Parenthood 
An argument prevalent among conservative Americans is that the existence of 
AFDCRANF has increased the incidence of single parenting, especially among never- 
married mothers. This concern, raised by Murray (1995) and others in the US, has 
surfaced in New Zealand, but has had no strong advocate, except for occasional magazine 
articles (McLaughlin 1997) and musing by politicians. The Personal Responsibilities 
section of PRWORA is explicitly designed to reduce single parenthood, especially among 
teenage mothers. In both countries there has been an array of policies to reduce the 
likelihood of teen pregnancy and single parenting, ranging from sex education to the New 
Zealand Strengthening Families project, and the equivalent programs which most US 
states have developed (Casey Foundation 1999). 
The issue here is to investigate whether the welfare system itself has any 
incentive effects for mothers to become single parents. This does not imply that incentive 
effects dominate, or are even relevant to becoming a single mother. All the same, it must 
be recognised that the existence of a welfare benefit has allowed many to escape from 
unsatisfactory and violent relationships. Some of the growth in numbers of single 
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mothers in New Zealand during the 1990s was due to a successful police campaign to 
reduce domestic violence. If Snively’s (1995) estimate of the annual cost of domestic 
violence is correct ($1.2 billion NZ), then the police campaign will have had a socially 
desirable outcome even if there is the short-term fiscal cost of an increased case load. 
The bottom section of Table 6 investigates the change in disposable income on 
becoming a single parent from a variety of possible family circumstances. In most cases 
there is relatively little financial gain, even if the alternative is very low earnings, on 
becoming a single parent. The calculations are based on the proportional difference in 
disposable income, before adjusting for housing costs, between the stated situation and 
being a single mother on welfare with a child aged three. For those moving off a benefit, 
in New Zealand it was the unemployment benefit, and for the US, previously the person 
was on unemployment insurance, based on full entitlement at 0.5 average male earnings. 
The disposable income of a single mother on AFDCRANF (in Pennsylvania) is 
58 percent higher than receipt of unemployment insurance. In New Zealand the increase 
in disposable income is more than double, partly because the unemployment benefit for 
somebody under 25 is very low. In both cases, the increase in disposable income exceeds 
the additional costs of a child. If the change to single parenthood is from earnings at 0.5 
average male earnings, in both countries there is a drop in the level of disposable income, 
even before the additional costs of a child is included. 
If the situation was that of an unemployed couple separating, then the father in 
the US would be better off, and worse off in New Zealand (if under 25), however mother 
and child would be roughly 40 percent better off in both countries. No child support 
payments have been included in this calculation - in both countries payment of child 
support would reduce the father’s income but not improve the situation of the mother and 
child as child support payments offset fiscal costs. If the couple was earning, then the 
father would have a substantial increase in disposable income, and standard of living, 
while the mother and child would be in the same financial situation. 
As Whiteford (1997) comments, benefit systems have other incentive effects. A 
single mother reconciling or forming a new partnership will have the reverse incentive 
effects to those listed here. In other words, for single mother with one child to partner 
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with a male on 0.5 average earnings, the male would be substantially worse off, and 
mother and child marginally poorer. 
Summary 
Since 1980, trends in case loads have been significantly different in the US 
compared to New Zealand. Whilst the US economic performance has been superior to 
that of New Zealand, resulting in far greater employment opportunities for single 
mothers, macroeconomics cannot explain the different trends in case loads. Cultural 
factors do not seem to be an explanation either, especially given the similar employment 
levels for married mothers between the two countries. Although benefit replacement rates 
are significantly higher in New Zealand, most studies have shown that incentive effects 
have a relatively small, but positive, impact on case loads. Neither does there appear to be 
any significant impact on the incidence of single parenting from either the provision of 
the welfare benefit or its structure and eligibility criteria. 
The major factor affecting case loads seems to be the objectives and operation of 
policy. The switch in policy objectives in the US from child rearing to employment took 
several decades, but seems to be the major factor behind the flattening off of case loads 
since 1980, and the reduction since the introduction of PRWORA in 1996. But a 
favourable macro-economy is also required for the policy to be successful: the 1991 
attempt in New Zealand to give greater emphasis to employment of single parents 
foundered on a stagnant economy. The 1998 policy changes in New Zealand have 
initially been more successful due to the improved macro-economy . 
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CONCLUSIONS 
New Zealand and the US have a substantially greater proportion of single parent 
families than all other OECD countries. There is no evidence to suggest that this high 
incidence is due to the provision of a benefit dedicated to single parents - AFDCRANF 
in the US and the DPB/Community Wage in New Zealand. Both countries have a very 
similar demographic structure, with most single parents being single mothers, a declining 
share of widows and a greater proportion of never-married mothers. There is a strong 
ethnic bias to single motherhood, with Maori in New Zealand and AfricadAmerican in 
the US having a far higher incidence. All the same, white Europeans make up the 
majority of single mothers, and have a very high incidence of single motherhood in the 
US, though average in New Zealand. 
Despite these demographic similarities, there are significant differences in the 
outcomes for single mothers. The US has a relatively high employment rate compared to 
other OECD countries, while New Zealand has one of the lowest employment rates. Most 
comparative studies have argued that employment is the best solution to poverty in each 
country. Even though employed single parents have far lower poverty rates than those 
receiving welfare benefits in both countries, when the comparison is made between the 
countries, the US is seen to have a very high poverty rate for single parents, whether 
employed or not. New Zealand, on the other hand, has a moderate poverty rate for single 
parents, although a significant proportion are trapped on the edge of poverty. 
There are several reasons for this paradox. First, welfare benefit levels in New 
Zealand are substantially higher than those in the US, being close to the international 
poverty line of 50 percent of median disposable income. The US benefit levels, which 
vary substantially between the states, are generally below even the meagre US poverty 
level. Second, the US employment success has been based largely on low wages, with the 
national minimum wage being below the poverty level for a single mother with children. 
New Zealand has had a more egalitarian wage structure (though it has had the largest 
increase in inequality in the OECD (Hills 1995)). 
There is also a substantial difference in the level and trends in case loads and 
fiscal costs of welfare provision. 
number on AFDCRANF, with 
Since 1980, the US has stabilised and then reduced the 
low fiscal costs, while New Zealand had increasing 
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numbers on the DPB and fiscal expenditures, at least until 1998. Policy differences 
account for much of this divergent trend: in the US the objective has been a switch from 
child-rearing to employment, with PRWORA representing the final switch to 
employment as the primary goal and welfare as a last resort. The switch to employment 
as a major objective of single mother policy in New Zealand started in 1991, but was 
hindered by a sluggish economic performance. Both countries have tried to contain 
expenditure and give labour force incentives by cutting welfare benefit levels, but 
changing the incentive structure has had little impact. 
It is too early for the New Zealand changes to be evaluated, but policy makers 
there need to take heed of the US debates and discussion. Most commentary on the US 
reforms is generally positive, mainly due to the massive fall in welfare rolls. But 
significant question marks over the outcomes of the reforms have been raised, as well as 
querying how single mothers will fare in an economic recession. It is recognised that 
there is still an unfinished agenda if single mothers in work are going to be able to 
support their families adequately, and the problems and issues for those remaining on 
welfare have to be faced. Some of this is too large for welfare reform, such as a change in 
the structure of low wage employment. But other strategies can operate within the 
existing framework; for instance the ideas suggested by Sweeney et a2 (2000), drawing 
upon existing innovations devised by different states, and Greenstein’ s (2000) proposal to 
extend EITC to larger families. 
Lerman (1998) is cautiously optimistic about the US welfare reforms, arguing that 
the results of new approach which “promotes work but continues to assist low-wage 
workers heading families ... are promising for many but damaging for some.” Loprest 
(1999) indicates that many of those who left welfare finished up in low-wage jobs at non- 
standard hours, and a quarter of leavers have no employment, and others have returned to 
welfare. Lazere (2000) shows that many states have unspent TANF block grant at the end 
of 1999, and argues that these funds could be used to reduce poverty through the 
provision of child care and transportation assistance. The EITC has lifted many working 
poor out of poverty (Greenstein and Shapiro 1998), but “the number of low-skilled jobs 
that pay enough to support a family has been declining” (Sweeney et aZ2000). 
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In some ways, the operation of the US welfare system, especially since the 
implementation of PRWORA, is along lines similar to that of Sweden. Both countries 
argue that employment is the first and preferred option, and have developed extensive 
case management approaches to ensure employment. However, the Swedes operate 
within an egalitarian economy with high wages for women, and extensive government 
provision of child care and paid parental leave. Poverty relief and child development are 
the prime concerns, and this is shown in the outcomes. The US government, at all levels, 
offers little assistance to offset the extra costs of work, and employment growth is in the 
low-wage, service sector of the economy, with little prospects for personal advancement. 
Part 2 of this paper will give a more detailed evaluation of the various policy 
options which can increase employment opportunities for single mothers, reduce poverty 
and provide positive benefits for the development of children raised in single parent 
families. These policy options need to operate at the level of the national economy, at 
regional levels and at local levels, which is where single mothers reside. Policy options 
need to take account of the way labour markets operate, and the dynamics of employment 
and welfare receipt. The policy options evaluated range from time limits for the dole 
through benefit levels, child care assistance to in-work financial and travel assistance. 
The EITC has probably been the most successful policy development, giving 
positive incentives to move into employment, increasing earnings and reducing poverty. 
However, there must be some concern that the provision of the EITC locks in a structure 
of low earnings, supplemented by government assistance, rather than providing a living 
wage. EITC also needs to be extended to larger families, and made more generous at 
wage levels which single mothers entering employment are likely to receive. 
An extension of FSTC and IFTC seems to be the most promising avenue for 
policy development in New Zealand to assist single mothers enter employment. But in 
both countries, in-work benefits are insufficient in the absence of affordable, high quality 
child care, improved education and training as well as the provision of transport in order 
to reach the jobs. Concern for the welfare of the child, especially younger children, 
should mean that part-time employment is the viable option, with the benefit system 
structured to provide that incentive. 
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exchange rate has fluctuated from 45cents to 55cents per US$, while purchasing power parity has been 




























































































































0 -I , I 
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 
Year 
-USA 
U N Z  
+ UK 
+Australia 
- -% - Norway 
- - 0 - .Sweden 
























































































































































I I I I I 



























































































b 0 rT) 
0 
d 















































































































































































































































Economic Growth and Unemployment Rates, 
New Zealand the US, 1980-1998 
-Unemployment USA 
- 0 - Unemployment New Zealand 
-Growth Real GDP USA 
- Jc - Growth Real GDP New Zealand 
Page 1 










Employment of Single Mothers, 1976-1996, New Zealand and USA 
. . .  























u) rn c .- 
El 
al 









u) m c .- 
El w 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
, 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
I 
I 
1 
0 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
0 
0 
0 rn
0 
G 
d 
0 PO 
'0 cv 
0 
0 
9 
d 
0 
I- cn 
L 
I 
I 
I 
t a 
4- 
z 
